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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
REHAN HASSAN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020885-SC

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from two convictions for aggravated burglary,firstdegree felonies,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-203 (1999), and three convictions for assault, class
B misdemeanors, in violation of

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-102 (1999). This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-2(3)(i) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Though defendant conceded below that he voluntarily and knowingly waived his
right to a jury trial, has he nevertheless established that the trial court plainly erred in
accepting the waiver without explaining the jury selection process?
Defendant did not advance this theory below and, therefore, consideration of its merits
for the first time on appeal is precluded unless defendant demonstrates plain error, that is,

that the trial court obviously erred in accepting defendant's otherwise undisputed voluntary
and knowing jury waiver without informing him of the jury selection process, and that,
absent the error, there exists a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been more favorable to defendant. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT 33, U 41, 488 Utah Adv.
Rep. 14 (reaffirming that obvious prejudicial error may be considered for the first time on
appeal). See also Davis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 891 -92 (Utah App.
1995) (applying the "more rigorous" plain error standard to review "a completely differen
theory" than argued in a motion for new trial).
2. Has defendant established that the court plainly erred in allowing him to represent
himself during the motion for new trial evidentiary hearing after defendant asked to proceed
pro se and refused the assistance of competent and conflicts-free appointed counsel?
Where a defendant expressly declines an offer of counsel, "he has the burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not so waive his right to counsel."
State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f 74, 63 P.3d 731. Accord State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, \
22, 979 P.2d 799. Because defendant did not object when the court permitted him to
proceed pro se, he must now establish that the court plainly erred in concluding that his
waiver of counsel was voluntary and knowing. See Casey, 2003 UT 33, f 41.
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following rule is reproduced in its entirety in Addendum A, together with any
other provision cited in argument:

2

R. CRIM. P. 17(c) - All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the
defendant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the court and the
consent of the prosecution.
UTAH

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 8, 1999, defendant was charged in Third District Court Case No. 991911407
[#1407] with two aggravated burglaries arising from illegal entries into Carol and J.D.
Miller's apartment on May 29, 1999 (R1407: 2-4). In the same information, defendant was
charged with three misdemeanor assaults for his subsequent assaults on Carol and J.D. and
a June 3, 1999, assault on Kathy Harris at the same apartment complex (id.). A month later,
defendant was charged in Third District Court Case No. 991915044 [#5044] with aggravated
burglary based on a third illegal entry into the Millers' apartment on May 29 (R5044: 1-3).
Following separate preliminary hearings, the cases were consolidated for trial (R1407:12-13;
R5044: 62-63).1
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial (R1407: 92-93; R5044: 106; R456: 3-8).2
See Addendum B (Jury Waiver Colloquy). On May 15-16, 2000, Judge Anne Stirba
1

The State cites to the pleadings in case #1407 as R1407: page # and in case
#5504 as R5044: page #. Citation to the consolidated hearing/trial transcripts are by
external record number followed by internal page, i.e., R454: 1.
2

During the hearing on the motion for new trial, defendant conceded and the court
concluded that defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived jury trial (R454: 29 & 144).
See Addendum E (Findings, Conclusions, and Denial of Motion for New Trial).
Defendant does not challenge this ruling on appeal, but argues that Utah law requires an
explanation of the jury selection process before a waiver may be accepted {Brief of
Appellant [Br.Aplt] at 1-2 & Point /). Defendant is entitled to raise a claim for the first
time on appeal under the plain error doctrine, but is bound by the lower court's
unchallenged findings and conclusions. See Davis, 905 P.2d at 890.
3

conducted a bench trial, during which defendant was represented by appointed counsel,
Edward Montgomery (R1407: 94-100; R5044: 120-22). Judge Stirba concluded that the
evidence failed to establish that defendant possessed a gun during one of the illegal entries
and acquitted defendant of Count I in #1407 (R1407: 99-100, 182). See Addendum C
(Findings, Conclusions, and Order of Conviction). The judge found defendant guilty of the
remaining five charges (R1407:99-105,282-87; R5044:123,127-32). See Add C. On July
18, 2000, defendant was sentenced to two terms of five-years-to-life imprisonment on the
felonies and three terms of six months incarceration on the misdemeanors, all sentences to
run concurrently (R1407: 204-05; R5044: 148-49).
Defendant privately retained Mary Corporon, who filed a motion for new trial which
alleged that trial counsel (Montgomery) was ineffective in failing to call a locksmith as an
expert witness and that an "alibi" witness, defendant's former girlfriend Maleena Tu Phan,
was located four days after trial (R1407: 202, 211-16; R5044: 143-47).3 Before the motion
was heard, defendant elected to proceed pro se (R1407: 296, 304-05, 370-72, 399, 409-10;
R204: 9-10; R449: 5-6, 11, 16-21; R452: 12-13; R453: 3-8; R455: 2-15; R457: 6-9).

3

Defendant referred to Maleena as an "alibi" witness, but the court, in denying the
motion for new trial, found that because defendant admitted he was at the Millers'
apartment, Maleena did not provide an "alibi" (R1407: 423-24; R5044: 198-99; R454:
115-18). See Add. E. Moreover, her proffered testimony did not exculpate defendant
because she heard defendant arguing with a woman, but did not otherwise know what
occurred (id.). Defendant does not challenge the court's findings and conclusions on
appeal.
4

Prior to proceeding pro se, defendant retained, was appointed, or was offered the
services of nine attorneys. David Grindstaff was initially appointed and represented
defendant through preliminary hearing (R1407: 10-13). Mr. Grindstaff withdrew when
defendant privately retained Ron Yengich, who represented defendant through pretrial
conference (R1407: 25-40; R5044: 19-42). Mr. Yengich negotiated an "extremely good"
plea offer, but defendant accused him of being an "undercover jew" and of conspiring against
him because he was Muslim (R1407: 41, 310, 345-46). Mr. Yengich withdrew based on
"irreconcilable differences" (R1407: 42,45; R5044: 46-48).4 Paul Quinlan of the Salt Lake
Legal Defender Association (LDA) was appointed, but withdrew because LDA represented
Carol Miller, a victim in this case, in a pre-existing misdemeanor assault on her husband
(R1407: 71-73, 77-86). Conflicts-counsel Edward Montgomery was then appointed and
represented defendant through trial (R1407: 86-100; R5044: 64-122). Prior to sentencing,
Mr. Montgomery withdraw when his relationship with defendant "completely deteriorated"
(R1407: 176-77, 297-98; R5044: 142; R448: 3-4).5 Defendant privately retained Mary
Corporon, who represented defendant at sentencing andfiledthe motion for new trial (id.).

4

Defendant persistently denounced Mr. Yengich as an "evil person . . . an enemy
of Islam," who "totally betrayed" him and "totally messed up" his case; however,
defendant did not claim in his motion for new trial and does not claim on appeal that Mr.
Yengich was ineffective (R1407: 345-46; R449: 5, 12-13).
5

In his motion for new trial, defendant alleged that Montgomery was ineffective
(R1407: 211-16; R453: 11-13). The court concluded that he was not (R1407: 420-24;
R5044: 195-99). See Add E. Defendant has not challenged the court's findings or
conclusions on appeal.
5

Eventually, Ms. Corporon moved to withdraw based on ethical considerations and
defendant's refusal to cooperate with her (R1407: 260-61; R448: 10-12; Exhibit 3).6 Heidi
Buchi (LDA) was appointed, but withdrew due to a conflict, and conflicts-counsel Stephen
McCaughey was appointed (R1407: 287-94). Mr. McCaughey reviewed the pleadings, the
findings in support of the verdict, and the new trial motion and memoranda; he did not
review the trial transcripts because they were not yet prepared (R449: 3). After Mr.
McCaughey arranged for the trial transcription, he withdraw due to "irreconcilable
differences" with defendant (R1407: 296-300).7
Defendant never objected to the withdrawal of his attorneys. According to defendant,
the attorneys were attempting to "override" his decisions (R204: 9-10, R449: 4-6). He

6

Defendant believed Ms. Corporon tried to unduly "silence" him when she
criticized his wife's contacts with Judge Stirba and the judge's husband and when she
warned defendant that his denunciations of Mormons and other "enemies of Islam" would
backfire (R1407: 345-46; R449: 5; Exhibit 3). While defendant was upset with Ms.
Corporon, he did not allege her ineffectiveness below or on appeal.
7

Defendant speculates that Mr. McCaughey was unprepared to proceed on the
motion for new trial {Br.Aplt. at 28 & n.6). While it is true that the trial transcripts were
not yet prepared, this does not support defendant's claim that Mr. McCaughey was
unfamiliar with the relatively simple facts of the case. In moving to withdraw, Mr.
McCaughey explained that he had reviewed various documents relevant to the new trial
motion and concluded that the motion was not likely to succeed; when he expressed this
view to defendant, defendant asked him to withdraw (R449: 3, 9). Defendant asserted
that he asked Mr. McCaughey to withdrew because he was "unduly influenced" by
defendant's "enemy," Mr. Yengich (R449: 5). See supra, n.4. Defendant did not allege
in his motion for new trial that Mr. McCaughey was ineffective and has not raised an
ineffectiveness claim on appeal.

6

acknowledged that he could get along with them if they did what he wanted, but admitted
that he was difficult (R204: 9-10; R455: 8).
After Mr. McCaughey withdrew, defendant asked to represent himself (R1407: 296,
304-05, 370-72, 399, 409-10; R204: 9-10; R449: 5-6, 11, 16-21; R452: 12-13; R453: 3-8;
R455: 2-15; R457: 6-9). Defendant wanted assistance in subpoenaing his prior counsel as
witnesses for the hearing on the new trial motion, but otherwise believed he was capable of
representing himself (R1407: 304-05; R449: 4-11). After conducting a Frampton-type
colloquy8, the court permitted defendant to proceed pro se, but appointed LDA as standby
counsel (R449: 16-20). See Addendum D (Self-Representation Colloquies).
LDA subsequently withdrew and Richard Mauro, conflicts-counsel, was appointed
(R1407: 353). Mr. Mauro hired an investigator to locate Maleena and other witnesses
necessary for the new trial hearing (R1407; 396-98). Mr. Mauro borrowed defendant's copy
of the trial transcripts, which had been delivered to defendant at the prison based on his pro
se status (R1407:343,396-98). Mr. Mauro was in the process of subpoenaing witnesses and
preparing for hearing when defendantfileda complaint with the Utah State Bar accusing him
of stealing the transcripts (R1407: 396-98). Consequently, Mr. Mauro withdrew from the
case (id.).9 Defendant told the court that Mr. Mauro's withdrawal made little difference to
8

State v. Frampton, 111 P.2d 183, 188-89 (Utah 1987) (recommending that a trial
court conduct a sixteen-point colloquy before permitting a defendant to represent himself
in a criminal trial).
9

Mr. Maurofiledan affidavit which explained his preparation and the
circumstances surrounding his use of defendant's transcripts (R1407: 396-98). Other
7

his preparation because Mr. Mauro was only stand-by counsel; defendant was ready to
proceed pro se and only needed assistance in subpoenaing his witnesses (R1407: 399).
Three days after Mr. Mauro withdraw, the court offered to appoint another conflicts
attorney, Manny Garcia (R455: 2-10). Hearing on the motion for new trial had previously
been set for the same day, but the court was willing to continue the hearing to allow Mr.
Garcia time to prepare (id.).10 Defendant objected and insisted that he could proceed without
Mr. Garcia's assistance as long as subpoenas were issued for his witnesses (id.). The court
agreed to help defendant secure his witnesses, and then questioned him on whether he still
wished to proceed pro se (R455: 6-27). See Add. D. Defendant did (id.).11
At his own request, defendant proceeded to lay "foundation" for his motion exhibits
and outline his new trial arguments in anticipation of the evidentiary hearing, which was
continued until defendant's witnesses could be subpoenaed (R455: 44-54).12 In setting out

than the bar complaint, defendant has not claimed below or on appeal that Mr. Mauro was
ineffective.
10

Defendant's assertion that the court forced him to proceed that day (Br.Aplt. at
35 n.9), has no record support. See Add. D (R455: 2-15).
11

On appeal, defendant insinuates that Mr. Garcia was neglectfully unprepared and
this caused defendant to proceed pro se (Br.Aplt. at 34-35). Below, defendant never
claimed this. In fact, he was apologetic to Mr. Garcia for refusing his assistance and
assured him that his refusal had nothing to do with Mr. Garcia personally (R455: 6-11).
He just felt that any new attorney would need three months to prepare and defendant
believed he was ready to proceed once his witnesses were subpoenaed (id.).
12

Defendant asked to proceed in this fashion because he wanted the court to
review his exhibits before the hearing (R455: 49).
8

his argument, defendant quoted rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, governing
motions for new trial, and acknowledged its limitations (R455: 17-71). See Addendum A
(Cited Provisions). The court noted that defendant evidenced an understanding of court
procedures (R455: 15).13
During the subsequent evidentiary hearing, defendant continued to represent himself
(R454: 4). He called as witnesses his former trial counsel, Mr. Montgomery; Nathan Pace,
Mr. Montgomery's conflicts-contract associate; Detective Burningham, the investigating
officer; and Mr. Paul Parker, the trial prosecutor (R454: 7-132). He also proffered the
testimony of Maleena, his missing witness, and submitted his exhibits (id.). Defendant
extensively argued the motion for new trial, gaining the praise of the court for his reasonable
presentation (R454: 136-48, 164-68). Nevertheless, the court denied it. Specifically, the
court found and concluded that (1) defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
a jury trial and his counsel, Mr. Montgomery, legitimately concurred in defendant's decision;
(2) Mr. Montgomery conducted adequate pretrial investigation and legitimately chose not to
present an expert locksmith or character witnesses; (3) Mr. Montgomery conducted an active
and viable defense and, despite its lack of success, provided defendant with effective

13

At various times, defendant expressed his understanding that: a discretionary
standard applied in reviewing a motion for new trial; the pending new trial motion needed
to be resolved before he could appeal; trial error must substantially impact a verdict to
justify a new trial; if Judge Stirba had lived, she would have been in a better position than
the judge assigned to the motion to access the impact of any "newly discovered" evidence
since she observed the trial witnesses; and if the victims were believed, the evidence was
sufficient to support the convictions (R1407: 119; R455: 22-24).
9

representation at trial; (4) even if Maleena had been located prior to trial, her testimony did
not provide an "alibi" for defendant and was cumulative of other evidence presented at trial;
and, therefore, (5) there was no basis upon which to grant defendant a new trial (R1407:41926; R5044: 194-201). See Add. E.
At defendant's request, LDA was appointed to represent defendant on appeal (R454:
168). A timely notice of appeal was filed (R1407: 458-74).
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdicts or the denial of his motion for new trial. Instead, defendant advances arguments
which were neither raised nor preserved below. Defendant acknowledges that for this Court
to consider the arguments, he must establish plain error (Br.Aplt. at 1-2).
STATEMENT OF FACTS14
Defendant admitted that around May 29, 1999, the electricity to his apartment was
cut off by the power company for non-payment (R450: 158-60). Without authorization, he
ran an extension cord from his apartment to a common basement laundry room where he
plugged the cord into power outlets belonging to the apartment complex (R450:161). Carol
and J.D. Miller lived across the hallfromdefendant (R450:21-22). The Millers were not the
apartment managers, but received a discount on their rent to watch the building. When J.D.

14

Though he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
convictions, defendant argues that the Millers' testimony was inconsistent and, therefore,
any error is necessarily prejudicial (Br.Aplt. at 23). The State summarizes the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdicts. See State v. Nichols, 2003 UT App 287, % 1, n. 1,
76P.3d 1173.
10

Miller saw the extension cord in the laundry room, he unplugged it, but did not confront
defendant (R450: 92-93). See Add C, Findings 1-7.
Later that day, defendant and his then-girlfriend, Maleena, went to his apartment and
discovered no power (R450: 163-66). Defendant assumed the Millers had interfered with
the extension cord (R450: 166-67). He was upset because he felt that neighbors should take
care of neighbors (id.). See Add, C, Findings 8-9.
Defendant admitted that he went to the Millers' apartment, Carol answered the door,
and a verbal argument ensued (R450: 167-70, 183). After Carol closed the door, defendant
admitted he kicked the door several times in frustration (id.). See Add, C, Findings 8-12.
What occurred next was disputed. According to defendant, he simply went back to
his apartment and had no more interaction with the Millers (R450: 170). Five days later, he
testified that Kathy Harris, the wife of the apartment manager, and Carol went to defendant's
apartment to discuss his unauthorized use of the building's electricity (R450: 173-74). An
extension cord was running from defendant's front door into a hallway electrical outlet
(R450:113-14,174). Kathy told defendant that he could not use the building's power (R450:
175). According to defendant, Kathy then reached inside his door to unplug the cord (id.).
He pushed her back (R450: 176). Kathy called the police and he was arrested (R450: 177).
The Millers and Kathy Harris described a different scenario. The Millers testified that
on May 29, defendant kicked in their front door and illegally entered their apartment three
times, assaulted Carol twice and J.D. once, and threatened to kill them if they called the

11

police (R450: 10-40,96-99).l5 They did not immediately report the burglaries or assaults to
the police because the Millers and defendant were the only tenants in the building and the
Millers had no telephone (R450: 87,100,125). Moreover, defendant was 29 years old, 6' 2",
and weighed 160 pounds (R450: 178). Carol Miller was almost sixty and weighed only 88
pounds (R450:27). Additionally, the Millers felt their injuries were minor and J.D. was able
to fix the damaged door (R450: 81, 104). See Add C, Findings 12-26.
On June 3, Carol reported defendant's unauthorized use of the building's electricity
to Kathy Harris (R450:113). Kathy and Carol went to defendant's apartment and confronted
him (id.). Kathy testified that she did not reach into defendant's apartment—she only
attempted to unplug the extension cord from the outlet in the building's hallway (R450:11317). When she bent down, defendant hit her in the mouth, pushed her up against the Millers'
door, grabbed her hair, and kicked her "a lot" of times (R450: 117). See Add. C, Findings
2 7-38. Unlike the Millers, Kathy immediately reported the incident to the police (R450:12324). When the police arrived, the Millers told them of the assaults and burglaries five days
earlier (R450: 123-25).

15

Carol also testified that defendant displayed a gun, but J.D. never saw a weapon
(R450: 39, 99). A realistic gun-shaped cigarette lighter was found in defendant's vehicle
(R450: 138-39). The trial court concluded that the evidence did not establish that
defendant possessed a gun during any of the illegal entries and acquitted defendant of
Count I, Case #1407 (R1407: 184, 187; R5044: 129, 132).
12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Waiver of Jury Trial: During the hearing on the motion for new trial, defendant
conceded and the court concluded that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to a jury trial. Nevertheless, defendant now claims that the trial court plainly erred in
accepting the waiver because it did not follow the procedure of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which requires an explanation of the jury selection process
before a waiver is accepted. At the same time, defendant acknowledges that Utah has not yet
adopted the Seventh Circuit requirement. His acknowledgment necessarily defeats his claim
of obvious error. Moreover, even in jurisdictions which follow the Seventh Circuit rule,
failure to follow the rule does not result in automatic reversal. Instead, the appellate court
looks to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the jury waiver to determine if it was
otherwise knowing and voluntary. Here, defendant conceded below that it was.
Waiver of Counsel re Motion for New Trial: Defendant was offered multiple
competent and conflict-free counsel to assist him with his motion for new trial, but ultimately
chose to proceed/?ro se. Two judges questioned him on two different occasions concerning
his choice. Both concluded that defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was voluntary and
knowing. Defendant has not established that any alleged deficiencies in those colloquies
plainly negated the validity of his waiver.

13

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
ACCEPTING DEFENDANTS WAIVER OF A JURY TRIAL WITHOUT
INFORMING HIM OF THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS
During the evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion for new trial, the prosecutor and
later the court questioned defendant's former trial counsel (Montgomery) about the
circumstances surrounding defendant's waiver of a jury trial (R454: 50 & 56-57). Counsel
testified that defendant first suggested a bench trial because he was concerned that a Utah
jury would be less inclined to believe a Muslim Pakistani national, like himself, and more
likely to credit white Americans, like the Millers and Harris (id.). While defendant believed
this was arose from inherent racism, he also recognized that people will often more readily
believe individuals similar to themselves (R1407: 53, 56A, 325). Two of defendant's
attorneys (Grindstaff and Montgomery) believed Judge Stirba, the trial judge, was strict, but
a non-racist, who hated liars—a bias beneficial to defendant's theory that the victims were
lying (R1407: 311). Defendant had observed the judge and felt she was fair (R1407: 119,
345). Consequently, defendant stated that he
planned, based on the way I planned the case, the way I evaluated the case, I
planned to go ahead for the [bench] trial based on what I though information
would be brought up, and I evaluated it, based on that information, there would
be a reasonable doubt, very clearly, a reasonable doubt in the mind of Judge
Stirba that this thing did not happen.
(R454: 29). Defendant conceded that
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I picked the judge and the jury, of course, it was my decision to pick the judge,
because I felt she would treat me-she would be more fair to me.
(R454: 144). In denying the motion for new trial, the court found that defendant's decision
to waive the jury was done with the legitimate concurrence of his trial counsel and concluded
that the waiver was voluntary and knowing (R1407: 420-21 & 423; R5044: 195-96 & 198).
See Addendum E (Findings and Conclusions - Denial of Motion for New Trial).
Defendant does not challenge this ruling on appeal. Instead, for the first time, he
claims that the trial court plainly erred in accepting the jury waiver because it did not follow
the procedure of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and explain the
jury selection process to defendant (Br.Aplt. at 1-2 & 15). The argument is without merit.
(A) The Trial Court Fully Complied with Utah Procedure in Accepting
Defendant's Waiver.
Rule 17(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, directs that all felony cases will be
tried by jury "unless the defendant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the court
and the consent of the prosecution" (emphasis added). See Addendum A (Cited Provisions).
Here, it is undisputed that the trial court fully complied with the rule (R456: 5-8). See
Addendum B (Jury Waiver Colloquy). Utah has no other mandated procedure governing jury
waiver. Consequently, Utah procedural rules provide no predicate for defendant's claim of
obvious error.
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(B) The Trial Court Properly Concluded that Defendant Knowingly and
Voluntarily Waived His Right to a Jury Trial.
Because the right to a jury trial is constitutional, its waiver must be knowing and
voluntary. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930); State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d
474,476-77 (Utah 1990). Utah requires the waiver to be in open court, but does not mandate
a set colloquy. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(c). Instead, the validity of a jury waiver is judged
by the totality of its surrounding circumstances. Moosman, 794 P.2d at 478-79.
Here, the trial court conducted a colloquy with defendant to determine if his decision
to waive a jury: was knowing and voluntary. See Add. B. Defendant had previously
discussed the advantages and disadvantages of a jury trial with his trial counsel (R1407:42021; R5044: 195-96; R456: 6-7). See Add. B & E. Defendant understood that he had a
constitutional right to a jury of eight persons, whose verdict must be unanimous (R456:5-7).
He knew that if he waived the jury, only the judge would decide the outcome of the case
(R456: 5-6).16 Several times, the court asked defendant if he was freely choosing to waive
a jury and if he had any questions about the waiver (R456: 6-7). Each time, defendant
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Defendant correctly notes that the court was somewhat tongue-tied in describing
its role: "Do you understand that a jury doesn't hear the evidence in this case, that it is
tried to me as a judge?" (R456: 7). However, the court immediately clarified its question:
Q: And that I will be the only person making the decision on the guilt or
innocence; do you understand?
A: Absolutely.
Q: And is that what you want to have happen?
A: Yes, Your Honor,
(id.)
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assured the court his choice was voluntary and knowing (id.). When defendant offered to
explain why he wanted to waive a jury, the judge injected that she was "not trying to talk
[him] out of it or into it" (R456: 6).17
Judge Stirba's conclusion that defendant's jury waiver was knowing and voluntary
was ultimately substantiated by defendant when he admitted, during the hearing on the
motion for new trial, that he weighed the alternatives, but chose a bench trial (R454: 29, 50,
56-57, 144). Additionally, it was validated by Judge Burton when, in denying the motion for
new trial, he found and concluded that "defendant's decision to waive the jury was a clear
and informed choice" (R1407: 421-22 & 423; R5504: 195-96 & 198). See Add E.
Defendant fails to acknowledge his admissions and does not challenge the new trial findings
and conclusions. Consequently, but for the rule defendant now proposes, it is undisputed that
defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived a jury trial.
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Defendant argues that his concern that jurors might be inherently racist
undercuts the validity of his jury waiver; he also argues that the court was obligated to ask
for and consider his reasons for waiving (Br.Aplt. at 18-19 & 21). Case law is contrary.
A defendant's fear of undetected jury bias or prejudice is a common and accepted reason
to waiver a jury. See Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 284 (Utah 1995) (recognizing that
law-trained judges more readily disregard personal beliefs than jurors and, thus, choosing
a judge over a jury is almost always a legitimate choice); State v. Maguire, 529 P.2d 421,
422 n.l (noting that fear of racism is a legitimate reason to waive a jury). See also Singer
v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) (recognizing that despite safeguards in the jury
selection process, a jury trial necessarily contains inherent weaknesses and the "potential
for misuse"); Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942) (recognizing that "[i]n a
variety of subtle ways trial by jury may be restrictive of a layman's opportunities to
present his case as freely as he wishes").
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(C) The Trial Court Was Not Obligated to Follow Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals Procedure Before Accepting Defendant's Waiver.
Plain error must be predicated on controlling authority. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that plain error requires error which is both obvious
and prejudicial); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 n.ll (Utah 1989) (explaining the
obviousness prong of plain error). Here, defendant acknowledges that Utah law does not
mandate the rule he advocates (Br.Aplt. at 12). Consequently, defendant's claim of plain
error necessarily fails. See Id.
Moreover, even if this Court were to provide prospective guidelines for jury waiver
colloquies, defendant overstates the Seventh Circuit rule he advocates.
The so-called Delgado rule directs federal district courts within the Seventh Circuit
to "explain that a jury is composed of twelve members, that the defendant may participate
in the selection ofjurors, and the verdict of the jury is unanimous" before accepting a waiver
of a jury trial. United States v. Delgado, 635 F.2d 889, 890 (7th Cir. 1981). Contrary to
defendant's characterization, this procedure is not constitutionally required, but only
judicially recommended. See Id. and United States v. Rodriguez, 888 F.2d 519,527 (7th Cir.
1989); Williams v. DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 1177-78 (7th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464
U.S. 1072 (1984) (both recognizing that Delgado rule arose from judicial prudence and not
constitutional necessity). See Singer, 380 U.S. at 36; Adams, 317 U.S. at 277 (both refusing
to impose strict procedural guidelines regarding jury waiver). If a district court does not
provide the recommended explanations, the Seventh Circuit Court does not presume
18

prejudice. Instead, the appellate court reviews the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the waiver to determine if, despite the failure to follow Delgado, the jury waiver is otherwise
voluntary and knowing. See Rodriguez, 888 F.2d at 528; Williams, 715 F.2d at 1177-81.
See also Marone v. United States, 10 F.3d 65,67 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Robertson,
45 F.3d 1423, 1431 (10th Cir. 1995); State v. Mitchell, 15 P.3d 314, 320 (Hawai'i 2000);
State v. Foote, 821 A.2d 1072, 1074 (N.H. 2003) (all acknowledging that there is no set
constitutional requirement for a voluntary and knowing jury waiver and, consequently,
whatever procedure is recommended or followed, a totality of the circumstances standard
ultimately applies).
Here, the trial court explained that a Utah jury would consist of eight members, whose
verdict was required to be unanimous. See Add. B. The trial court did not further explain
the jury selection process to defendant, though subsequently, in denying the motion for new
trial, the motion court found that "[defendant and Mr. Montgomery discussed the di fficulties
and benefits of a bench trial as compared to a jury trial . . . [and djefendant decided that
Judge Stirba would be more favorable than a jury that would not likely be able to relate to
defendant's background and beliefs" (R1407:420-21; R5044: 195-96). See Add. E. Based
on this finding, the motion court concluded that with the advise of counsel, defendant made
a "clear and informed choice" to waive a jury (R1407: 423; R5044: 198). See Add. E. See
also Williams, 115 F.2d at 1181 (noting additional validity given jury waivers made with the
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assistance of counsel). Defendant has not acknowledged, much less challenged, the lower
court's findings and conclusions establishing the validity of his jury waiver.
Consequently, even if, arguendo, Utah prospectively adopted a Delgado-typs rule, it
would not change the outcome in cases like this, where the record establishes the voluntary
and knowing nature of the waiver.18
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED DEFENDANT TO PROCEED
PRO SE DURING THE HEARING ON THE MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL AFTER HE REJECTED COMPETENT AND CONFLICT-FREE
COUNSEL
Defendant privately retained, had appointed, or was offered the services of multiple
experienced and competent counsel. But for LDA, they were all conflict-free at the time of
their appointment. See Statement of the Case, supra. David Grindstaff withdrew because
defendant retained Ron Yengich. Two LDA attorneys withdrew in the pretrial stages
because they represented one of the victims in a separate case; one LDA attorney withdrew
in connection with the motion for new trial based on an unspecified conflict with defendant.
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At least one member of the Court has expressed interest in a Delgado-type rule.
See State v. Garteiz, 688 P.2d 487,488-89 (Utah 1984) (Durham, J. specially
concurring). However, traditional totality of the circumstances analysis has been
effective. See, e.g., Moosman, 794 P.2d at 477-79 (upholding jury waiver); State v.
Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297-98 (Utah 1986) (reversing jury waiver). Moreover, if a
supervisory rule were imposed, its non-mandatory non-constitutional nature should be
made clear. See Williams, 715 F.2d at 1178-86 (extensively distinguishing the Delgado
rule from Sixth Amendment requirements and refusing to "constitutionalize" the rule).
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The rest—Ron Yengich, Edward Montgomery, Mary Corporon, and Richard Mauro—
eventually withdrew because, in essence, defendant refused to cooperate with them. See Id.
Defendant refused the services of Manny Garcia. See Id. At one point, defendant expressed
a desire to privately retain a Muslim out-of-state attorney, but later represented that even
though the Pakistan government offered to provide him one, he preferred to 'Tight this thing
[the motion for new trial] by myself because "I'm capable of doing it myself (R453: 9).
Defendant was clear why he wanted to represent himself in the hearing on the motion
for new trial. Beginning pretrial and continuing throughout the proceedings, defendant
consistently rejected those who disagreed with him. See Statement of the Case, supra. He
complained when his attorneys did not follow his directions, failed to consult with him before
filing motions, or criticized his actions. See Id. He believed that his attorneys wanted to
"silence" him and were mutually involved in a "cover up" and/or conspiracy against him
(id.). He did not trust the American justice system and called his trial counsel (Montgomery),
the prosecutor, the victims, and the investigating detective "liars" (R1407: 310, 435-56,
R449: 5-7). He accused Mr. Yengich of hating him because he was a Muslim (R1407: 34656; R449: 8). He viewed the trial judge as fair and non-racist, but turned on her when she
sentenced him to prison (R1407: 119, 311).19
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After trial, defendant wrote Judge Stirba to express his appreciation for her
fairness and admitted that if the victims were believed, the evidence supported the
verdicts (R1407: 119). Later, after he was sentenced to prison, he claimed her death was
retribution: "I previously assumed that Judge Stirba would grant me justice but instead
she sold my soul to devils and bought plenty of hell fire for her" (R1407: 345). Such
21

Defendant also wanted to represent himself because he wanted the freedom to express
his views, including his political concerns (R204: 9-10; R499: 3-5; R453: 7-8; R455: 14).
When he was represented by counsel, he knew that he could not directly communicate with
the judge (R1407: 71). If he represented himself, he believed no such stricture applied
(R1407: 304-05). He did not feel that his attorneys believed in his case (R1407: 304-05;
R499: 9-10; R455: 12-13). If he proceeded pro se, he would have "a chance to make it [the
lies] public" and "say what I am going to say" (R499: 5-6, 9-11).
Defendant expressed his desire to represent himself to Judge Lubeck, who, after Judge
Stirba died, handled an early post-trial hearing, and Judge Burton, who heard and denied the
motion for new trial (R1407: 296, 304-05, 370-72, 399,409-10; R204:9-10; R449: 5-6, 11,
16-21; R452: 12-13; R453: 3-8; R455: 2-15; R457: 6-9). Both judges were familiar with
defendant's writings and Judge Burton interacted with defendant on several occasions (id.
& R449: 17; R455:15). Judge Lubeck conducted the initial waiver colloquy, and Judge
Burton conducted a second inquiry a year later (R449: 3-21;R453:10-17; R455:2-28). See
Addendum D (Counsel Waiver Colloquies).

Both judges concluded that defendant

voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to counsel (R449: 20; R453: 11, 15).
Now, for the first time on appeal, defendant claims that the court plainly erred in
accepting the waiver (Br.Aplt. at 1-2 & Point II). Defendant asserts that he did not

exchanges were typical of defendant when he disagreed with a person (R1407: 41, 47-53,
56A, 361-63, 370-72, 374-75, 379-81; R449: 3-6).
22

voluntarily waive counsel, but was forced to proceed pro se because his attorneys were
"disinterested" in the case (Br.Aplt. at 26-39). He claims that his choice to proceed pro se
was not knowing because the colloquies did not fully conform to those recommended in State
v. Frampton, 737P.2d 183,187-88 (Utah 19S7) (Br.Aplt. at 42-46). See infra, n.23. Finally,
defendant argues that the court's acceptance of the waiver necessarily prejudiced him
because if he had counsel during the hearing on the motion for new trial, he would have
established that his trial counsel's failure to call an expert locksmith adversely impacted the
outcome of the trial (Br.Aplt. at 48-49). Defendant's claims have no merit.
(A) Defendant Rejected the Offer of Competent and ConfllcUFree Counsel.
Because defendant expressly declined the offer of counsel, "he has the burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not so waive his right to counsel."
State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, U 74,63 P.3d 731. Accord State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, If
22, 979 P.2d 799. This requires that defendant establish that (1) he did not voluntarily
decline an offer of competent, conflict-free counsel, and that (2) he did not knowingly elect
self-representation. See Id. Further, because defendant did not object below, he must now
establish plain error in the court's acceptance of his waiver.20. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT
33, If 41, 488 Utah Adv. Rep. 14.
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Defendant acknowledges that even if successful, he is only entitled to a new
evidentiary hearing with the assistance of counsel, not a new trial (Br.Aplt. at 27).
23

Defendant attempts to meet his burden by arguing that his rejection of counsel was
"not entirely voluntary" because he was "required to chose between counsel disinterested in
the case, and proceeding pro se" {Br.Aplt. at 39 & 27-41). The claim has no record support.
Below, defendant never claimed that his attorneys were "disinterested."

He

complained that they did not share his view of his motion for new trial, or claimed that they
were "unduly influenced" by his "enemy," Mr. Yengich. See Statement of the Case, supra.
See also State v. Wulfenstein, 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah) (reaffirming that a defendant has
no right to "pick and choose and discharge his court-appointed counsel at will with a demand
or expectation that the court will appoint a new one"), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 803 (1987).
Ms. Corporon drafted andfiledthe motion for new trial (R1407:202-16). Defendant
complained that she did not consult with him in its drafting and did not incorporate all of his
arguments; however, he was allowed to present arguments beyond those in the written
motion (R453:7-8). When Ms. Corporon withdrew, defendant disclaimed knowing why she
wanted to withdraw, but later accused her of improperly trying to curtail his anti-Mormon,
anti-American outbursts. See Statement of Case, supra.. Ms. Corporon explained that she
withdrew for ethical reasons and because defendant refused to cooperate with her.21 See Id.
Defendant postulates that Mr. McCaughey was unprepared and disinterested {Br.Aplt.
at 28 & n. 6). When Mr. McCaughey withdrew, he briefly explained what lead to defendant's
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Defendant implies that Ms. Corporon withdrew over money {Br.Aplt. at 27-28
n.5). This is misleading. When she moved to withdraw, Ms. Corporon simply explained
that defendant was indigent and entitled to appointed counsel (R448: 10).
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rejection of him. Mr. McCaughey reviewed the pleadings, the findings and conclusions in
support of the verdicts, and the motion for new trial and memoranda, and then told defendant
that he did not believe the motion for new trial would succeed. See Statement of the Case,
supra. Defendant immediately asked him to withdraw. See Id. Mr. McCaughey did not
represent that he had completed his preparation for the hearing and did not suggest that the
trial transcripts were not necessary. To the contrary, he told the court that defendant was
entitled to the transcripts and then arranged for their preparation and delivery to defendant
at the prison before he withdrew (R1407:298,340,343; R449:3-4). In sum, the record does
not support defendant's assertion that Mr. McCaughey was derelict.
Similarly, defendant suggests that the prosecutor improperly tried to remove standbycounsel (Mr. Mauro) and that Mr. Mauro did not meet with defendant {Br.Aplt. at 33). The
record does not support the suggestion. Once, shortly after he was appointed, Mr. Mauro
did not appear (R1407: 353; R453: 3). The prosecutor asked defendant to clarify if he was
willing to proceed without counsel for purposes of that hearing (R453: 3). In the same
hearing, defendant said Mr. Mauro had not met with him (id.). Six months later, when Mr.
Mauro withdrew, the attorney verified that he had met with defendant, discussed the motion
for new trial, hired an investigator, and was in the process of preparing for hearing when
defendant filed his bar complaint. See Statement of the Case, supra. Again, the record does
not support that Mr. Mauro was "disinterested."
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Three days after Mr. Mauro's withdrawal, the court offered to appoint Manny Garcia,
but defendant refused his assistance (R1407: 405, 409-10; R435: 2-10). The refusal had
nothing to do with Mr. Garcia's interest in the case; the problem was that because he had just
been appointed, he needed time to review it. See Statement of the Case, supra. Defendant
objected: he was ready to proceed and saw no reason for more delays.22 See Id.
Defendant's suggestion that the court forced defendant into proceeding without
counsel is equally without support. See Br.Aplt. at 35 n. 9. The court offered to continue the
motion hearing if defendant accepted Mr. Garcia's assistance, but if as defendant suggested,
"today was the day," Mr. Garcia was not ready through no fault of his own (R455: 2-10).
Subsequently, during the same hearing, the court realized that defendant's witnesses were
not subpoenaed and continued the evidentiary hearing after agreeing to assist defendant in
subpoenaing them (R455: 25-27, 39-45).

The court did not pressure defendant; it

accommodated him.
In sum, defendant was offered multiple competent and conflict-free attorneys, but
expressly rejected their assistance. Consequently, defendant waived his right to counsel
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Defendant argues that he did not voluntarily waive counsel because he asked for
substitute counsel, i.e., a Muslim attorney (Br.Aplt. at 31). This distorts the record.
Defendant knew he was not entitled to the appointment of a Muslim out-of-state attorney,
but hoped that his family might privately arrange for one (R449: 16-19). He was
provided time to arrange it (id.). Subsequently, defendant told the court that the Pakistan
government offered to provide him with Muslim representation, but he wanted to proceed
pro se(R453: 9).
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unless he now establishes that the trial court plainly erred in concluding that the waiver was
voluntary and knowing.
(B) The Court Did Not Plainly Err in Allowing Defendant to Proceed Pro Se.
Defendant claims that even if he expressly rejected counsel, the colloquies failed to
fully comply with Frampton and, therefore, the court plainly erred in concluding that
defendant's waiver of counsel was voluntary and knowing (Br.Aplt. at 42-47). The argument
is without merit.
The Sixth Amendment grants a criminal defendant the right of self-representation as
well as the right to counsel. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 15. When a defendant expresses
a desire to proceed pro se, the trial court must question him to ensure that he is knowingly
and voluntarily relinquishing his right to counsel. See Id. at ffl| 15-23. This Court
recommends a 16-point colloquy.23 See Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f 70. But compliance with
the recommended colloquy is not dispositive; instead, the test is whether, under the totality
of the circumstances, the waiver is knowing and "expressly made with 'eyes open.'"/*/, at
H 15 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). In other words, the record
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In Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188-89, the Court recommended sixteen questions
concerning a defendant's understanding of the rules of evidence and procedure, and their
application to the hearing in question; his past experience, if any, in self-representation
and his understanding that the court cannot advise or assist him; his knowledge of the
crimes and penalties; his understanding that his testimony must proceed by question and
answer; and the voluntariness of his choice. It also directs trial courts to warn against
self-representation and to consider the appointment of standby counsel if the defendant is
allowed to proceed pro se.
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must establish that the defendant was provided with sufficient information to make a choice,
even if that choice is not an intelligent or wise one. See State v. VanCleave, 2001 UT App
228,f 17 n.6, 29 P.3d 680, cert, denied, 40 P.3d 1135.
Defendant analyzes isolated questions in the colloquies to support his claim of error
(Br.Aplt. at 42-46).

Such an approach does not fairly consider the totality of the

circumstances surrounding the waiver as required by controlling case law. See Arguelles,
2003 UT l,f 70; Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 17-25. When placed in context, the court properly
concluded that defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived counsel.24
Judges Lubeck and Burton were aware that defendant was a Pakistani national who
had resided in the United States for 10 years (R1407: 56,308,315). Defendant obtained one
college degree in Pakistan and a second degree in Idaho, though he worked as a taxicab
driver in Utah (R1407: 315; R449: 16). He was fluent in both written and spoken English
and did not require a translator. He was married to an American and had sufficient family
support that he was able to twice pay "thousands of dollars" and hire private counsel (R1407:

24

Consideration of the totality of the surrounding circumstances is particularly
appropriate in this case, where a year elapsed between the first and second colloquies,
during which time defendant continued to seek self-representation. See discussion,
supra. Additionally, in the same hearing, immediately following the second colloquy,
defendant "outlined" his rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, argument and laid
"foundation" for his exhibits (R455: 17-71). See Add. A. A month after this, defendant
represented himself in the evidentiary hearing (R1407: 415). Consequently, the court had
much more than the bare colloquies from which to judge the voluntary and knowing
nature of defendant's waiver of counsel. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,ffif15-26 (analyzing
waiver of counsel in context of entire case history).
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345-56; R449: 5-7). He was also appointed multiple attorneys at state expense and was
provided transcripts at state expense. See Statement of the Case, supra. Through his wife,
he had assembled a "report" entitled "Travesty of Justice," which protested his innocence,
summarized the case, and criticized the justice system (R1407:306-35; R449:45; Exhibit 7).
The report had beenfreelydistributed to the judges assigned to defendant's case, the media,
the governor of Utah, and the Pakistani Consulate General in Los Angeles, California (id.).
Defendant filed documents with Judges Lubeck and Burton and appeared before Judge
Burton on other occasions. See Statement of the Case, supra. Both judges expressly
considered defendant's past conduct, knowledge, and intelligence in judging the validity of
his waiver (R449: 17, 20; R455: 15). At the same time, both judges warned defendant that
he would be at a disadvantage in representing himself (R449: 17-28; R455: 12-13).
Defendant was not law-trained and had not previously represented himself, but he
spoke extensively to Mary Corporon about rule 24 and the limitations it placed on a motion
for new trial (R449: 16-18; R453: 10;R455: 12-13,20-23,27,64). He could quote the rule
verbatim and understood its requirement of substantial prejudicial error; he also recognized
that a discretionary standard applied to a motion for new trial (id. & R453: 7-14). He
recognized that until the new trial motion was resolved, deportation was unlikely and an
appeal precluded (R448:15;R449:7;R455:12). He discussed the merits of the motion with
Ms. Corporon, Mr. McCaughey, and Mr. Mauro (R204: 4; R453: 10, R449: 3).
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Defendant planned on using Mary Corporon's new trial motion as a ''guideline," but
would present additional arguments within the context of rule 24 (R449: 16; R453: 7-14).
Defendant recognized his need for trial transcripts and also wanted transcripts of the hearings
leading up to the evidentiary new trial hearing (R449:4; R452: 7-8,28,31; R453: 21; R455:
18). He properly requested subpoenas for his witnesses and recognized his right to call
adverse witnesses, including the prosecutor and the investigating detective (R457:6-8; R455:
3-5). He had read the prosecutor's response to the motion for new trial and believed he could
refute it with logic and a showing of ineffective counsel (R453: 7-8, 11-14).
Defendant claims, for thefirsttime on appeal, that the court plainly erred in accepting
his waiver because the court did not anticipate an evidentiary hearing and did not question
defendant accordingly (Br.Aplt at 44). Defendant is incorrect. While Judge Lubeck early
on assumed the motion would be resolved with legal argument, Judge Burton, a year later,
knew an evidentiary hearing was required and discussed this with defendant, including what
witnesses he wanted subpoenaed and the general parameters of his argument (R449: 20;
R453: 5-7, 17; R457: 2-9; R455: 39-45, 65-71). Defendant exhibited a clear understanding
of evidentiary hearings based on his own trial experience—indeed, at one point, defendant
expressed surprise that the investigating detective was not present in the courtroom since he
was exempted from the exclusionary rule (R453: 5-6).
Nevertheless, defendant now claims that he did not understand that he could testify
during the motion for new trial (Br.Aplt. at 44). The claim is disingenuous: defendant
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testified in his own trial and compelled his opposing counsel (the trial prosecutor) to testify
at the evidentiary hearing (R450: 13-186; R454: 65-70, 83-101). Moreover, in light of
defendant's arguments (ineffective counsel and newly discovered evidence), there appears
little reason for defendant to have testified at the evidentiary hearing. In any case, defendant
fully expressed facts and personal views throughout the new trial proceeding—for as
defendant acknowledged below, acting pro se provided him with more freedom to express
his views (R1407:304-05). Indeed, when he had been represented by counsel, defendant felt
he had a *;rope tied" around his neck, which the lawyers continually tightened (R449: 4-5).
In sum, the waiver of counsel colloquies fairly conformed with Frampton's
recommendations. The voluntary and knowing nature of defendant's waiver was further
supported by defendant's extensive and skilled interactions with the court. Consequently,
defendant has failed to establish any obvious error in the court permitting defendant to do
what he wanted—to stop dealing with attorneys and to proceed pro se.
(C) Defendant Has Not Established that He Was Prejudiced.
As defendant acknowledges, even if he, arguendo, established obvious error, he must
still establish that the error was prejudicial (Br.Aplt. at 47-50). See Casey, 2003 UT 33, «[j
41. Here, defendant's claim of prejudice may be summarily rejected.
Defendant argues that his trial attorney (Montgomery) was deficient in deciding not
to call a locksmith to discredit the Millers' account of the damage to their door (Br.Aplt. at
47-50). He also claims that if he had realized no expert would testify, he would not have
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waived a jury (Br.Aplt. at 49-50). Defendant asserts that but for the waiver of counsel at the
evidentiary hearing, he would have established that the failure to call a locksmith adversely
impacted the outcome of his trial {Br.Aplt. at 50).
Essentially the same arguments were presented and rejected during the hearing on
defendant's motion for new trial. Defendant claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to call a locksmith as an expert witness. See Statement of the Case, supra. Mr.
Montgomery explained he had investigated this possibility, but the locksmith he contacted
supported the State's case. He decided that even if he found an expert favorable to the
defense, an inconclusive battle of the experts might ensue (R454: 41-43, 48, 114, 118-19).
He opted instead to attack the Millers' testimony by pointing out its inconsistencies (id.).
The court found and concluded that trial counsel's decision was legitimate and did not
constitute ineffective counsel (R1407: 421-22, 424; R5044: 196-97, 199). See Add. E.
Defendant does not challenge this ruling on appeal—he impermissibly ignores it.
Defendant's claim, that he would not have waived the jury if he had known no expert
witness would testify, is equally unsupported by the record. During the hearing on the
motion for new trial, defendant explained that he considered his defense as a whole in
waiving the jury, but did not claim that his decision would have been different if he had
known that no expert would be called (R454: 29, 144). Instead, as found by the motion
court, defendant and his trial counsel decided that based on defendant's apprehension of a
Utah jury and Judge Stirba's reputation for fairness, a bench trial might be more beneficial
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to defendant (R1407: 311, 420-21; R5044: 195-96; R454: 29, 50, 57, 144). See Add. E.
Again, defendant simply ignores this finding.
* * *

In sum, defendant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he did
not waive counsel or that the court plainly erred in concluding that the waiver was voluntary
and knowing. See Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f 74.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm defendant's multiple convictions for aggravated burglary and
assault.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A 3 ^ d a y of January, 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Plaintiff/Appellee were mailed to LINDA M. JONES, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION, attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt
Lake City, UT 84111, this A3 day of January, 2004.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A
Statutes, Rules, Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. Amend. VI
Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (2003)
Utah R. Crim. P. 24 (2003)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1999)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1999)

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.)
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public tnal, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROLhDuna
Rule 17. The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel The defendant shall be
personally present at the trial with the following exceptions
(a)(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions,
defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence,
(a)(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death,
the defendant's voluntary absencefromthe trial after notice to
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from
being tned and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall
have the same effect as if defendant had been present, and
(a)(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from
trial for good cause shown which may include tumultuous,
notous, or obstreperous conduct
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require
the personal attendance of the defendant at the tnal
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tned in the
following order
(b)(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody
(b)(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody,
(b)(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recogm
zance, and
(b)(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail of
recognizance
(c) All felony cases shall be tned by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the court
and the consent of the prosecution
(d) All other cases shall be tned without a jury unless the
defendant makes wntten demand at least ten days pnor to
trial, or the court orders otherwise No jury shall be allowed in
the tnal of an infraction
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a tnal jury shall
be as specified in Section 78-46-5, U C A 1953
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the
consent of the accused and the approval of the court, by
stipulation in wnting or made orally in open court, proceed to
tnal or complete a tnal then in progress with any number of
jurors less than otherwise required
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the tnal
shall proceed in the following order
(g)(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated,
(gX2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening
statement and the defense may make an opening statement or
reserve it until the prosecution has rested,
(g)(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the
charge,
(g)(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may
present its case,
(g)(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits,
(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other
appropnate time, the court shall instruct the jury, and
(gK7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either
side or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall
open the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument The
court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel
for each party and the time to be allowed for argument
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified dunng
tnal and an alternate juror has been selected, the case shall
proceed using the alternate juror If no alternate has been
selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number
of jurors remaining Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged
and a new tnal ordered
d) Questions by jurors A judge may invite jurors to submit
wntten questions to a witness as provided in this section
(i)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the
judge shall control the process to ensure the jury maintains its
role as the impartial finder of fact and does not become an
investigative body The judge may disallow any question from
a juror and may discontinue questionsfromjurors at any time
(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the
judge should advise the jurors that they may wnte the
niiAatirtrt act if ruvMira Kn f K o m and

Q l l h m i t frh#» flUPStlOn t o t h e

(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and
unrepresented parties and rule upon any objection to the
question The judge may disallow a question even though no
objection is made The judge shall preserve the wntten question in the court file If the question is allowed, the judge shall
ask the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented party
to ask it The question may be rephrased into proper form The
judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to exam
me the witness after the juror's question
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury
to view the place in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, or in which any other matenal fact occurred, it
may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of
an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some
person appointed by the court for that purpose The officer
shall b* <?worn that while the mrv are thus conducted he will
suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak
to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the
trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delav
or at a specified time
(k) At each recess of the court whether the jurors are
permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse among
themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial and
that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon
until the case is finally submitted to them
(1) Upon retmng for deliberation, the jury may take with
them the instructions of the court and all exhibits which have
been received as evidence, except exhibits that should not, in
the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury such
as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband The court
shall permit the jury to view exhibits upon request Jurors are
entitled to take notes dunng the tnal and to have those notes
with them dunng deliberations As necessary the court shall
provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on
taking and using notes
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury thev
shall be kept together in some convenient place under charge
of an officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged
unless otherwise ordered by the court Except by order of the
court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow
any communication to be made to them or make any himself,
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict and
he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to
any person the state of their deliberations or the verdict
agreed upon
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire
to be informed on any point of law ansmg in the cause they
shall inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court The court may then direct that
the jury be brought before the court where in the presence of
the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the
inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be
given Such response shall be recorded The court may in its
discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having
the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry
and the response thereto shall be entered in the record
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face
it nay be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court,
or the jury may be sent out again
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution or
at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an
order dismissing any information or indictment or any count
thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally
sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser
included offense

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 24. Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own
initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is
any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse
effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and
upon notice. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or
evidence of the essential facts in support of the motion. If
additional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence
the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such
time as it deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days
after imposition of sentence, or within such further time as the
court may fix during the ten-day period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same
position as if no trial had been held and the former verdict
shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or in
argument.

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-5-102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force
or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence,
that causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused
caused serious bodily injury to another.
aoos

76-6-203. A g g r a v a t e d burglary*
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or
another participant in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a
participant in the crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the
crime; or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony.
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the
same definition as under Section 76-1-601.
1989

Addendum B
Jury Waiver Colloquy
(R456:5-8)

savar at that time.
MR. MONTGOMERY:

That doas not work for ma, Your

Honor•
THE COURT:

It doas not?

Okay.

Marci, do you hava another tima.
THE CLERK:

Friday tha 28th at 8:30.

THE COURT:

All right.

And do I hava tha Jury

Instructions, voir dira and —
MR. MONTGOMERY:

Wa can provida them further.

My

cliant is willing to waiva a jury trial; and tha Stata is in
concurrence with that.
THE COURT:

I see. All right.

Mr. Hassan, if you would —
sworn in.

I'd like to have you

Would you please raise your right hand?
(Defendant sworn.)

All right.

Mr. Hassan, do you understand that as a

criminal defendant in both of these trials you have the right
to have a jury of eight people to decide the outcome of the
case?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
jury —

Yes, Your Honor.

And that if this were to be tried to the

and that that is a constitutional right that you have.

All right.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

That if this were to proceed to a trial

Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter

by jury, a vardict of guilty would raquira an unanimous
vardict of all aight jurors; do you undarstand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yas, Your Honor.

All right.

And I undarstand that you

wish to waiva your right to a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yas, Your Honor.

Do you undarstand that maans that you'd

ba giving up your right to a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yas, Your Honor.

And is that what you want to do, giva up

your right to a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yas, Your Honor, I do.

I hava

soma raasoning for that —
THE COURT:

Pardon ma?

THE DEFENDANT:
decision.

I hava soma raasoning for making that

I hava writtan something down.

It's difficult to

ma, but these things I hava -THE COURT:

Wall, let ma ask you this:

I want to

maka sura that you understand what you are doing and that you
are giving up your right to a jury trial knowingly and
voluntarily and with full understanding of what you are giving
up.

I am not trying to talk you out of it or into it.

I'm

just trying to make sure you understand what you are doing.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

You talked about this decision to give up

Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter

your right to jury trial with counsel?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

Is anyone pressuring you to give up your

right?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Are you doing it of your own free will?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

Yes, Your Honor.

Do you have any questions about — do you

understand that a jury doesn't hear the evidence in this case,
that it is tried to me as a judge.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

And that I will be the only person making

the decision on the guilt or innocence; do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

And is that what you want to have happen?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Absolutely.

Yes, Your Honor.

All right.

THE DEFENDANT:

Not any questions about this thing.

THE COURT: All right.
trial issue right now.

Any questions about it?

I'm focusing on the jury

Okay, I'm just focusing on that.

You might have questions about other aspects of the
trial, but if you have any questions about giving up the right
to a jury trial, now is the time to ask me.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor, I don't.

All right.

Based on your testimony, I

Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter

find that you have knowingly, voluntarily and with full
understanding of your rights given up your Constitutional
rights to a jury trial, and the case will proceed to the Court
beginning on May 1st, and I'll schedule three days for that.
In lieu o£ that, then jury instructions are not
needed.

We will begin the trial at 9:30 in the morning.
Are there any motions in limine?
MR. MONTGOMERY:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

All right.

And Mr. Parker for the State, the State is also
giving up its right to a trial by jury?
MR. PARKER:
THE COURT:

We are, Your Honor.
Okay.

MR. MONTGOMERY:

I think we can —

if it helps the

Court at all, I don't think it is going to take three days. I
think we can do it in two or perhaps less than that.
THE COURT:

All right.

Well, I do want to talk about whether Mr. Hassan
would feel comfortable with an interpreter.

I know that he

communicates very well in English, but given the pace of the
trial does your client require an interpreter present?
MR. MONTGOMERY:

I don't think so. We've discussed

it, and I don't think so.
THE COURT:

All right.

Is there any other matter that we need to attend to
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter

Addendum C
Findings & Conclusions - Verdicts
(R1407:182-87; R5044:127-32)
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PAUL B. PARKER, 5332
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

I
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER OF CONVICTION

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 9919H407FS and 991915044FS
REHAN HASSAN,
Hon. Anne M. Stirba
Defendant.

j

On May 15, 2000, this matter came before this Court for trial. The State was represented
by Paul B. Parker, Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney. Defendant was present and represented
by Edward R. Montgomery. The State called as witnesses Carol Miller, J.D. Miller, Kathy
Harris, Officer Bruce Evans and Detective Brad Burmingham. The Defendant testified and also
called as a witness Abdou Bah. Photographs of the door of the Miller's apartment were admitted
into evidence. Following the evidence both sides presented closing arguments.
Having listened to the witnesses and having admitted the evidence and after having
considered the arguments, this court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FfNPtNQS OF FACT
1.

On May 29,1999, J.D. and Carol Miller lived in an apartment located at 550 East
300 South #1, Salt Lake City, Utah.

2.

Defendant lived in the same apartment building directly across the hallfromthe
Millers in apartment #2.
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3.

The Millers were hired to assist in taking care of the apartment building. They
received a reduction in the amount of their rent for their services.

4.

Sometime prior to the 29th, the electrical power to defendant's apartment was shut
off by the power company.

5.

To get power inside his apartment, defendant ran an electrical cord from his
apartment out into the common areas of the building and plugged the cord into a
electrical outlet.

6.

The power for the outlets in the common area of the apartment building waspaid
for by the building owners and defendant did not have permisson to use the power
for his own apartment.

7.

On the 29lh of May, the Millers found the electrical cord from defendant's
apartment and J.D. unplugged it.

8.

Defendant became upset when he found the cord unplugged.

9.

Around 8:30 p.m., defendant went to the Millers' apartment door and confronted
Carol about the cord.

10.

Carol did not let defendant inside but rather left him standing in the hall outside
the door.

i i.

A verbal argument followed and eventually Carol shut the door.

12.

Defendant became upset and kicked at the outside of the door several times until
the door flew open.

13.

Defendant entered the apartment with the intent to assault Carol and/or J.D.

14.

Defendant told Carol that he was going to kill her and J.D. and then he grabbed
Carol by the arm and threw her to the floor.
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15.

Defendant's actions in grabbing Carol and throwing her to the floor caused Carol
pain and caused a small bruise on her arm.

16.

Defendant left the apartment.

17.

The Miller's closed the door and tried to secure it.

18.

About ten minutes later, Defendant again broke through the Miller's apartment
door.

19.

Defendant entered with the intent to assault Carol and/or JD.

20.

Defendant went to one of the bedrooms where Carol Miller was dressing.

21.

Defendant again threatened to kill Carol. Defendant also grabbed Carol and
pushed her to the floor.

22.

Defendant then went to J.D. and hit him in the face and grabbed his hair.

23.

One of J.D.'s teeth was broken by the blow.

24.

Defendant then left.

25.

Defendant returned a third time.

26.

This Court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that he had a gun as he entered
the apartment that third time.

27.

On June 3, 1999, Kathy Harris was working with her son outside the apartment
building at 550 East 300 South.

28.

Kathy is the wife of Ed Harris. Ed is the manager of the apartment building.

29.

Kathy assists her husband in managing the building.

30.

Carol approached Kathy and told her that defendant had plugged another power
cord into the common area outlets.
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31.

Kathy approached defendant's front door and saw an extension cord running
across the hall connecting defendant's apartment with a common outlet in the
hallway.

32.

Kathy knocked on defendant's door.

33.

Defendant answered the door. Kathy explained that she was Ed Harris1 wife and
that defendant could not use the apartment building's power in his own apartment.

34.

Defendant knew that Ed Harris was the apartment manager.

35.

Kathy did not enter or attempt to enter defendant's apartment.

36.

Kathy did reach down to unplug the power cord from the hallway outlet.

37.

Defendant immediately hit Kathy in the mouth, shoved her against the wall across
the hall and began to kick her repeatedly.

38.

Defendant's blows caused Kathy pain and soreness.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The elements of the crime of Burglary are: entering or remaining unlawfully in a
building with the intent to commit an assault.

2.

The elements of the crime of Assault are: an act committed with unlawful force or
violence that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.

3.

The elements of the crime of Aggravated Burglary are: in attempting, committing,
or fleeing from a burglary the actor causes bodily injury to any person not a
participant in the crime or uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the crime or possesses or
attempts to use a dangerous weapon.
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4.

A dangerous weapon is defined as any item capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury; or a facsimile or representation of the item; and the actor's use or
apparent intended use of the items leads the victim to reasonably believe the items
is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury or the actor represents to the
victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item.

5.

Bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical
condition.

6.

Serious bodily injury means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death.

7.

Defendant's first entry into the Miller's apartment with the intent to commit an
assault on the Millers meets the elements of Burglary.

8.

Defendant's acts of grabbing Carol Miller and throwing her to the floor caused
bodiliy injury to Carol Miller and meets the elements for Assault as charged m
count IV of case 991911407.

9.

Defendant's acts that caused bodily injury to Carol Miller occurred while
defendant was in the commission of burglary of the Millers' apartment, therefore
the elements have been met of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count number
II of case 991911407.

10.

Defendant's second entry into the Miller's apartment with the intent to commit an
assault on the Millers also meets the elements of Burglary.

11.

Defendant's acts during the second entry of hitting J.D. Miller in the face and
pulling his hair caused bodily injury to J.D. Miller and meets the elements for
Assault as charged in count V of case 991911407.
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12.

Defendant's acts causing bodily injury to J.D. Miller occurred during defendant's
commission of burglary of the Millers' apartment and therefore meets the
elements of Aggravated Burglary as charged in count number I of case number
991915044.

13.

Defendant's acts hitting Kathy Harris in the mouth and kicking her caused bodily
injury to her and therefore meets the elements of Assault as charged in count III
of case 991911407.

14.

Defendant's entering the third and final time does not meet the element of
Aggravated Burglary as charged in count I of case 991911407.

QRPER
Having made the abovefindingsof fact and conclusion of law, IT IS THEREFORE
ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that defendant is guilty of counts II, III, IV, V of case
991911407 and of count I of 991915044. IT IS ALSO ADJUDGED AND ORDERED
that defendant is not guilty of count I of 991911407.

DATED this 26th day offctfay, 2000
BY THE COURT:

ANNE M. STIRBA, District Judge
Approved as to form:

Edward R. Montgomery

Addendum D
Waiver of Counsel Colloquies
(R449:3-21; R453:10-17; R455:2-28)

1 I

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3
4

THE COURT:

Good morning.

Welcome.

Utah vs. Rehan Hassan, case No. 991911407.

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

This is State of

Are you Mr. Hassan?

Yes.

Mr. Hassan is present with his attorney

7

Steve McCaughey.

8

the time calendared for oral argument on a motion for a new

9

trial, which was filed by Ms. Corporon, on Mr. Hassan's behalf,

10

The State is here with Mr. Parker.

back in August of last year.

Mr. McCaughey?

11

MR. McCAUGHEY:

12

couple of problems here.

13

and he indicates that he would like to have —

14

he wants to have.

15

before this argument proceeds.

16

This is

Your Honor, initially we have a
One, I have spoken with Mr. Hassan,
a couple things

He wants to have the transcript of the trial

I have talked to him a little bit about the issues in

17

the argument, and told him, while we can argue these issues, I

18

don't believe they are particularly meritorious issues.

19

concern seems to be more with the political nature of this

20

case, as opposed to the factual nature.

21

expression to me was that if I didn't agree with his take on

22

the case, then he probably should represent himself.

23

him that I am not a politician, I am a criminal lawyer, and my

24

evaluation, without having seen the trial transcripts, but with

25

having seen the findings of fact prepared by Judge Stirba, and

His

And so his desire, his

I told

1

reviewing the documents filed by the numerous attorneys in this

2

case, that he and I probably didn't agree on the best way to

3

approach this case. And so he would like to have the

4

transcripts ordered.

5

the argument for the new trial.

6

represent himself, and I would ask permission to withdraw.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. PARKER:

9
10

I think he is entitled to that prior to
But I think he wants to

Mr. Parker, what is your position?
Well, I suppose my only difficulty on

this is this is not the first time the defendant has had
difficulty with his attorney.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. PARKER:

We have just —

Mr. McCaughey is No. 6.
Yes. And we just went again and again.

13

There has been continuance after continuance of various

14

motions.

15

say, No. 6 on this series of attorneys.

16

the defendant is going to have to take responsibility for his

17

actions, and work with the appointed attorneys that he has. We

18

are prepared.

19

The issues are fairly clear.

20 I on it.
21

None of this is Mr. McCaughey's fault.

Somewhere down there

This motion has been filed almost a year ago.
We both filed responsive motions

I think we need to proceed as soon as we can.
THE COURT:

Mr. Hassan, let me address you directly,

22

then.

23

behalf.

24

obtain the transcript, and argue it, yourself?

25

He is, like I

You heard Mr. McCaughey, what his request was on your
That's what you want to do, you want to put this off,

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, your Honor.

If I could explain

1

a few more things, be on the record right now.

The trial

2

transcripts are the key for my case.

3

them.

4

problem was there, apparently, Mary Corporon ended up filing a

5

memorandum without my consent, without my consultation, without

6

my approval, and she did whatever she wanted to do.

7

whatever money she wanted to when she dropped the case,

8

whenever she felt it right.

9

without going through my case?

I have been asking for

Now, if you said I had problems with my attorneys, the

She took

How could somebody present me
That is as clear as daylight.

10 I No attorney can really, like Mr. McCaughey, cannot know,about
11 I my case until they know that the key to success to my case is
12

my trial transcripts.

13

As far as the religious or political issues

14

concerned, yeah, I am waiting, I consider my case to be on the

15

same grounds as Laurie Berensen, and I am a victim, not a

16

criminal.

17

an opportunity at all by Judge Stirba to express myself.

18

all the time under pressure, if I speak, the attorneys kept

19

telling me not to say anything, not to say anything, if I

20

speak, it is like a rope tied on my neck, and it will get

21

tighter, and I will end up spending more time in prison and all

22

those things.

23

My wife has been suppressed.

I have not been given
I was

My case has been and is as clear as daylight, open

24

discrimination.

There is no doubt about it.

25

totally messed up the case.

I will —

Mr. Yengich

one by one, I am willing

1

to explain all the attorneys what they did to me.

2 I it is 100 percent cover up.
3

make it public.

4

worked day and night.

5

All it is,

I want to be given a chance to

We have tried all avenues, me and my wife,

There are a lot of things Mr. Parker has done which

6

are definitely very cruel of him and very evil of him.

7

reason to say that this person is an enemy of Islam.

8

person is a racist.

9

life hell.

I have

This

This person has made my life and my wife's

I care less if I live or if I die, anymore.

I am

10

fighting for the sake of my religion, for the sake of my

11

dignity, my family value.

12

things, to stand against injustice.

13

to the last drop of my blood.

14

has decided let me go next year, October, if this case wound

15

up, is being proceeded more than that, sir, I don't want to

16

get —

17

don't mind if you want to put me on death row.

18

broken.

19

don't want to get overemotional.

20

a lie.

21

is.

22

My religion has taught me a few
And I will fight this case

If, like the Board of Pardons

I don't want to spend the rest of my life in prison.

My arm has been

These people have tortured my life day and night.
This is a hypocrisy.

This is an attack on my religion.

The door was never broken.

I

I

This is

That's all what it

How in the earth I could

23

go inside.

These people keep on lying, Mr. Parker keep on

24

lying putting those false witnesses on the stand, never gave me

25

a chance to explain myself.

Detective Burningham, 100 percent

1

lied.

I gave him the phone number.

2

witness.

3

am on medication now.

4

breakdowns now.

5

prison.

6

Burningham should be put into prison.

7

not alive anymore, and may God do justice whatever she did to

8

me.

9

He didn't call the

What is my fault in that?

I have been tortured.

I

I have been going through nervous

I believe Mr. Parker should be put into

This person should be put into prison, and Detective
Luckily, Judge Stirba is

I am not willing to give in at all, at any cost, no

10

matter whatsoever.

I love my wife.

I want to be with her.

If

11

you force me to take deportation, that won't work.

12

it to —

13

clearly sir, I am not a terrorist, I am not a criminal, I am a

14

victim here.

15

to torture an innocent person on the basis of his religion, the

16

basis of his beliefs, the basis of the way he looks, or because

17

I have married a Mormon wife, and people hate me for that, and

18

just because she does not even know if the Mormon religion is

19

right or wrong.

20

My religion tells me to respect all the religions.

21

respected all the religions.

22

religion.

23

said anything bad.

24

wife from approaching the way she is approaching.

25

approaching me when I go through a nervous breakdown.

I will make

if anything happens to me, I am going to tell you very

But if you guys want to go to the point you want

I have nothing against the Mormon religion.
I have

I do have my opinions on Mormon

I still have the right of speech.

But I have not

I have been told by Judge Stirba to stop my
She is
She

1

wrote me.

2

I have everything in documentation.
Sir, please, give me a chance to explain at least

3

once myself.

I know you don't like what I am saying.

Give me

4

a chance to explain what I am saying.

5

for my own physical, mental health.

6

happen to me, then the consequences, I am not saying, you know,

7

whatever, but then my appeal is to the Muslims.

8

Muslims are here.

9

the Pakistanis over there, what are they doing?

This is very important

But if anything would

All the

You know the situation in any land.

And all

If you want

10

something to get started in this country, feel free for,that.

11

Torture me more, put me in prison.

12

Sir, please don't interrupt me right now.

13

MR. McCAUGHEY:

I didn't.

14

THE DEFENDANT:

I thought your gestures were bad.

15

You are a friend of Yengich.

Yengich has totally betrayed me.

16 I Mr. Yengich is an evil person.

He is an enemy of Islam, too.

17

He has written me the letters, which I have everything in

18

record.

19

me the letter, going back to the conversation, stop your

20

wife —

21

from approaching her or her husband.

22

my wife?

23

doing amything which she —

24

physically.

25

She is a free person.

My wife has everything in record.

sir, can I get some water, please —

How could I stop her?

I am in prison.

Judge Stirba wrote

stop your wife

What do I have to do with

How could I stop her from

I don't have —

I cannot stop her

I have no control of my wife.

She has the right of free speech.

She

1

felt with her heart, her heart felt good, she know what we have

2

been through.

3

whatever she wants to.

4

case public.

5

again.

6

including Mary Corporon.

7

She believes in my innocence.

She can do

It is not against the law to make my

My wife has been suppressed again and again and

All attorneys told me not to say a single word,

These things need to be brought out, into the light.

8

I am saying all these things for my own government.

I want all

9

this documentation to be sent to my government in Pakistan,

10

eventually it is going to go to some religious leaders in

11

Pakistan and all over.

12

happens to me.

13

stood for justice and right.

14

much.

15

not to make it a religious issue, not to approach anybody, not

16

to petition.

17

hide?

18 I

I would be a martyr if something

I consider myself as a symbol of Islam who has
My attorneys have tortured me so

Mary Corporon told me not to make it a political issue,

Why?

What is there to hide?

What is there to

I have nothing to hide.
Mr. McCaughey is saying I don't have any chance to

19

win my trial, or my appeal.

If that's the approach, after

20

knowing all that I have been through, then he is not a

21

competent attorney at all.

22

the same as Ron Yengich.

23

walk next door to him, to Mr. Parker's office, in spite of my

24

numerous, numerous appeals to him.

25

him so many letters, for God's sake, go and find the evidence.

He does not know my case.

He is

Ron Yengich did not bother to even

I have letters.

I wrote

1

Where the heck is the evidence?

2

my sleep.

I need to see it.

I am losing

I have not'done it.

3

These people, I have heard stories they are cable of

4

going back and breaking the door which is not broken.

5

Fortunately, all the people saw it.

6

and the witnesses say it again and again, how am I guilty?

7

in the earth did the judge find me guilty?

8

evil judge.

9

me or whatever.

10
11
12

I am going to say it.

If the door is not broken,
How

Judge Stirba is an

I don't mind if you torture

You guys want to start a holy war, let's go

for it.
But I am innocent.

And this case will go, you know,

I would not take any torture or whatever.

I am willing to die

13 I on a dignified life, if my blood can bring a revolution toward
14

an evil system in these courts and misuse and abuse of power,

15

which I have experienced a lot in the prison system, too, they

16

will stop me again and again from saying my prayers, they have

17

tortured me a lot, and I have — my arm has been broken, I

18

became handicapped for the rest of my life just because

19 I Mr. Parker decided to put me in prison, just because he has no
20

other way to cover his evil deeds up.

And I have — before

21

that, it was different, the rope was tied.

22

rope tied.

23

strongly believe that nobody cam help me or harm me, but God.

24

If he does not will, you people cannot do anything to me.

Now there is no

I am going to say what I am going to say.

25 I is my belief.

That is where I stand.

I

That

1

I want to represent myself.

I want to take care of

2

my kids.

I want to be given an appropriate chance to prepare

3

my case.

I want my trial transcripts to be given a copy to me.

4

And, I don't know, the other, I want my parents to get a copy

5 I in Pakistan, because they are approaching the press over there.
6

That is a key for my innocence.

And I have told my father to

7

write a book, just like Laurie Berensen's mother has written a

8

book.

She was in NASA, and said something common between me

9

and —

my mother and her, that she is also a physicist.

10

Laurie Berensen has been tortured.

11

case very clearly.

12

And

I have been following her

Whatever she is saying, same as my plea.

I am standing against injustice.

I have had enough.

13

I have racism in this country.

10 years I have been here. I

14

have seen enough.

15

worth living after this. Mary Corporon told me Judge Stirba

16

only put me to prison because she is pissed, or she was -- I

17

should say —

18

And what wrong did I write in those letters?

And there has to be a stop.

Life is not

she was pissed because I wrote her some letters.
My letters should

19 I be sent out to public, everything I have written should become
20

public.

I have not written anything bad.

I have not

21

threatened anybody.

22

made threats?

23

never threatened nobody.

24

prison, I am going to threaten the judge or somebody?

People told me that I made threats. I

This is the biggest lie of the century.

25 I don't have a clue.

How dumb or stupid do I look?

I am not an ignorant person.

I have
In
You guys

People know

1 I me of my intelligence, of my smartness, of the way I am, my
2

heart is.

This person comes and says whatever he wants to. I

3

have been putting with Mr. Parker for a long, long, long time.

4

He is just trying to get reelected to become a district

5

attorney or something.

6

just get the fame.

7

justice won't be served, then my blood be on his shoulders, and

That's the reason he is doing it, to

He is 100 percent enemy of Islam.

8 I on Mr. Detective Burningham's hands.
9

I am willing to die.

That's all, your Honor.

10
11

If the

THE COURT:

Mr. Hassan, have you taken any steps to

obtain this trial transcript?

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

14

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

Who?

I went to my attorneys.

Which attorney?

Mary Corporon.

They don't reply my calls.

She never contacted

15

me.

Every time I ask them

16

something, they find am excuse to drop my case.

17

Buchi to do the same thing.

18

trial transcripts.

19

whatsoever.

I asked Heidi

I kept on begging her, I need the

She dropped my case, for no reason

I believe she dropped my case because I said that

20 I Mr. Gilbert Athay, who is, apparently, on the board list
21

something, has also betrayed me, because he was willing to take

22

my case, but Mr. Yengich used his undue influence on him to not

23

let him take my case.

24

McCaughey.

25

good friend of his.

And same Mr. Yengich is doing with Mr.

I know that.

Mr. McCaughey say Yengich is a very

Mr. Yengich has a lot of power.

And I am

1

against- the power.

2

good other than just betray me.

3 I Mr. Yengich.
4

Mr. Yengich, to me, has not done anything
And I am not afraid of

I care less.

I am sorry, I will go to the point.

5

what you ask me.

6

drink a little more water?

7

I understand

I just have too much inside of me.

THE COURT:

So can I

I am on medication.

I am just trying to get at the timing of

8

this.

9

argument, I am trying to find out when that can be done.

10

If you are going to get a transcript and have another

don't have a transcript now?

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

13

You

No, sir, I don't.

Have you made arrangements with whatever

court reporter was here at the trial to get that transcript?

14

THE DEFENDANT:

Sir, right now I am indigent, and I

15

thought that my state-appointed attorney would take care of

16

them, my transcripts.

17

when they approached him.

That's something my parents asked him

18

MR. McCAUGHEY:

19

been assigned a conflict contract.

20

those transcripts.

21
22

THE COURT:

25

I have

I think he is entitled to

I understand that.

I was just wondering

where we were in terms of —

23 I
24

Your Honor, he is indigent.

MR. McCAUGHEY:

I don't think anything has been

ordered.
MR. PARKER:

I have not seen a motion at all for

1

them, your Honor.

2

Campbell.

3
4

It looks like the reporter was Gayle

THE CLERK:

She is retired, but I am sure they have

access to the transcript.

5

THE COURT:

It does seem to me that there is

6

certainly no harm in getting a trial transcript on a request

7

for a new trial. Mr. McCaughey, what's your suggestion?

8

you help us do that?

9

to argue his case, do you think you can file the appropriate

10

Can

Even though Mr. Hassan doesn't want you

motion to obtain a trial transcript?

11

MR. McCAUGHEY:

12

MR. PARKER:

I can do that.

May I suggest, your Honor, that although

13

there won't be a trial, we are just talking about a motion for

14

a new trial, I think it behooves us, still, to make sure that

15

there is a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to

16

counsel.

17

him that he will have difficulty representing himself in this

18

affair.

19

thinks he has or reason to believe he can do it on his own, and

20

something to indicate the nature of the proceeding and what he

He has had several.

I would ask the Court to advise

Perhaps if the Court can obtain any experience that he

21 I is up against.
22

THE COURT:

23

mind doing that.

24

or at the hearing.

25

that now.

Well, thank you, Mr. Parker.

I had in

I wasn't sure if I was going to do it today
But I suspect it is a good suggestion to do

1

Mr. Hassan, what I am going to do, at your request,

2

is not hold this argument today.

3

and I will review it.

4

copy of it, as well, of course.

5

back and allow you to argue this motion.

6

appoint another attorney.

7

hired and who has been appointed.

8

Mr. Grindstaff, and Mr. Montgomery, Ms. Corporon, Mr. Yengich,

9

Ms. Buchi from LDA, and Mr. McCaughey.

10
11

We will get the transcript,

You will have a copy.

You will get a

And we will set a time to come
I am not going to

I am not certain of who has been
But you have had

So I am not going to

appoint another attorney.
You indicate you want to argue it yourself.

I want

12

to talk to you about that a little bit, Mr. Hassan.

I have

13

allowed you to make this statement that you wanted to today.

14

And I have no problem with that.

15

few things about the hearing we will have in the future. We

16

will set the time in awhile.

17

argument under the rule of law.

18

person you mentioned, whose case you are following, enemies of

19

Islam, leaders of Pakistan, I don't, respectfully, care about

20

those things.

21

understand it, in the State of Utah, in the United States, you

22

are entitled to a new trial.

But you need to understand a

And that is that it will be an
With all due respect, this

I am interested in whether, under the law, as I

So when we come back, that's what

23 I I am going to restrict you to.
24
25

Tell me a little about yourself.

I understand you

have a college degree and an MBA, is that correct, or Master of

1
2
3
4

Public"Administration?
THE DEFENDANT:

I have a Master's of Commerce from

back home, and a Bachelor's of Marketing.
THE COURT:

Do you have any experience with the legal

5

system, at all, other than what you have been through in regard

6

to this case?

7

other than this case, do you have any familiarity with the

8

legal system?

9
10
11

I know the history of this case, and so on.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

But

No, sir, I don't.

Have you, since you have been, since last

July, have you been studying the law in prison, at all?

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

No, sir.

Do you understand the Rules of Criminal

14

Procedure, what is required to demonstrate and what is required

15

for you to show, to justify a new trial?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

I believe I cam follow some

17

guidelines of the motion of new trial which was filed by Mary

18

Corporon, though she did not mention all the facts in that. I

19

believe that I have smmn what Mr. Parker's arguments is, and I

20

can very well cover them by reasoning.

The only reason I have

21 I to take charge of this case myself is that I don't have a
22

Muslim representation.

Unless I am entitled to get a Muslim

23

representation or counsel from outside the state, from Los

24

Angeles or something, which I don't know, I don't trust the

25

legal system over here.

1

THE COURT:

You are certainly entitled to hire any

2

attorney you want to represent you.

3

appoint anyone else, simply given the history of this case.

4

Mr. Hassan, you need to understand that, in my opinion, it is a

5

mistake for you to represent yourself at even this type of

6

hearing.

7

consider are fairly restricted.

8

if there are proper grounds that justify a new trial. Many of

9

the things you have mentioned today, I have seen in writings

10

that you have provided to the Court, and that Ms. Updike, at

11

least they are signed by Elizabeth Updike, have provided to the

12

Court, the case history and so on.

13

said, I have seen in some form or close to that form.

14

those, Mr. Hassan, will not be considered in this argument.

15

I think it is a mistake for you to pursue it yourself.

16

are certainly entitled to represent yourself, and the Court and

17

our legal system can't force an attorney upon you.

18

should only do that and I will only allow it if I am convinced

19

that you are able to do that.

20

It is fairly restricted.

But I am not going to

The things I am going to

I am simply going to consider

Many of the things you have
Most of
So

But you

But you

Now, it is obvious to me, not only from just your

21

education, but from seeing the history of this case and seeing

22

you here today, and hearing you, that you are an intelligent

23

person.

24

Rule 24 is of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is

25

the rule that dictates what is required to be shown to justify

But I don't know that you have a full grasp of what

1

a new trial.

2

But, Mr. Parker, anything else that you think I ought

3

to inquire about with Mr. Hassan?

4

case State

5

should comply with in terms of allowing someone to represent

6

themselves.

7

vs. Framp ton.

I understand there is that

I haven't read it for some time. I

Any other suggestions?

MR. PARKER:

I also haven't read Fraxspton for awhile.

8

I think the Court, basically, covered it.

I understand

9

Fraapton required the Court to indicate the difficulty, of some

10

of the problems, make a strong recommendation that he dp it,

11

himself, consider his experience and his intelligence, and I

12

think the Court has done all of that.

13

to allow Mr. McCaughey to withdraw, and allow him to represent

14

himself.

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

17

THE DEFENDANT:

I think it is sufficient

Your Honor, may I?

Yes, go ahead.
Considering what you told me,

18

considering especially what you told me about getting a Muslim

19

counsel, my understanding was —

20

the legal system.

21

outside Los Angeles —

22

trying to get an attorney from Los Angeles.

23

waste the time of the Court, and I am in prison, anyway, if it

24

is appropriate, I could be given like a month or so, and I can

25

make a final attempt with my parents and my consulate general

I don't have much knowledge of

It is extremely hard to get an attorney
outside Salt Lake or Utah.

And I was

I don't want to

1

and see if I can hire a Muslim counsel within a month or month

2

and a half or something, if possible.

3

willing to.

4

THE COURT:

If not, then I am

Someone give me their best estimate, if

5

Ms. Campbell has retired, when do you think a transcript can be

6

available?

7

MR. PARKER:

8

of months.

9
10

Anyone?
I would suggest we set it for a couple

I guess it was just a day.

THE COURT:

Then brought back the next day for the

ruling.

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

It was scheduled for two days, but it

took only one day.

13

THE COURT:

I don't know if Ms. Campbell is still

14

around.

I am assuming she is. My experience, generally, is we

15

could get that transcript and so on within 30 days or so,

16

assuming she is around here.

So what I am going to do,

17 I Mr. Hassan, is schedule a hearing about 60 days away from now.
18

If you can hire your own attorney, you can give that attorney

19

this date.

20

argue that, yourself.

21

soon as it is available.

22

everyone is at a bit of a disadvantage as far as knowing

23

exactly when we can get that.

24

time for you to prepare for that.

25 I

If you can't or don't, then you be prepared to
We will get that transcript to you as
I can't say when that is.

I think

But that would still be ample

So I will find that Mr. McCaughey has a basis to

1

withdraw, and I will allow him to withdraw.

2

for the purposes of this argument, where there will not be

3

evidence presented, where there will simply be argument, and

4

you were present at the trial and testified at the trial, that

5

you, Mr. Hassan, are able to represent yourself at that

6

hearing.

7

are capable of arguing and understanding Rule 24, basically

8

have to show that an injustice was done at the trial.

And I will allow that.

9 1

I will find that,

Believing, as I do, that you

So I will allow you to represent yourself.

I will

10

ask Mr. McCaughey, before he leaves, to do whatever he can to

11

file the necessary papers to order that transcript.

12

he will be off the case.

13

THE DEFENDANT:

And then

The transcript will come to you.
Your Honor, just I want to apologize

14

the heat which was coming, with all due respect, you know, I

15

have nothing against someone in particular or something.

But I

16 I do want to say that, for the heated argument, heated things
17

which have been inside of me, what I said, but there is no

18

offense, I don't want you to take any offense towards you or

19

something, please.

20

THE COURT:

I don't easily take offense, Mr. Hassan.

21

But at the argument I will again expect you to confine yourself

22

to those things that are relevant.

23

you off, probably.

24

days away.

25

Don't worry.

THE CLERK:

But I am not going to cut
Let's get a date about 60

We could do that the morning of

1

October 11.

2

MR. PARKER:

That's fine with the State, your Honor.

3

THE CLERK:

4

MR. PARKER:

5

THE CLERK:

Yes.

6

THE COURT:

If, Mr. Hassan, we run into trouble and

That would be at 8:30.
October 11 at 8:30?

7

don't get a transcript about 30 days before that, then we will

8

make sure you know about it.

9

THE DEFENDANT:

But we may have to change that.

Your Honor, just the last thing, I

10

would also like my transcripts —

11

responsibility, but I want the transcripts to be given to my

12

parents.

13

would take a little bit more time.

14

can directly send the transcripts, because they are working on

15

my case.

16

Mr. McCaughey has on my case.

17

I know it is not the Court's

I am willing to pay the cost.

And also I need all my —

THE COURT:

The only thing, it

I don't know if the Court

all the material

I am sure Mr. McCaughey will return that.
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As far as transcripts to anyone else, you will have to take

19

care of that.

20

anyone else you would like, and they can take care of that. We

21

will see you back here on the 11th at 8:30.

22

any difficulty with this transcript, we will certainly keep you

23

advised of that.

24
25

You can certainly get a copy to your wife or

Again, if there is
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THE COURT:

UH-HUH.

THE DEFENDANT:

I'M GOING TO BE VERY CLEAR, THIS IS

NOT A THREAT AT ALL, THIS IS MY FEELING, THIS IS THE WAY I
PERCEIVE BECAUSE OF, I WANT JUSTICE TO PREVAIL ONE WAY.
SIMPLY ASKING FOR JUSTICE.

I'M

I'M NOT SAYING, GET MY RELIEF

BECAUSE THEY HAVE OFFERED ME MY RELIEF ALL THE TIME, I'M NOT
TAKING IT.

I'M JUST SAYING I NEED JUSTICE.

SO KEEPING THAT IN

MIND, I DON'T WANT FURTHER DELAY, I WANT YOU TO PLEASE
UNDERSTAND THAT THE TIME IS OF A REAL SENSE RIGHT NOW AND THE
EARLIER IT'S DONE THE BETTER IT WOULD BE.

THESE ATTORNEYS, IF

THEY CAN BE CONTACTED AND THEY CAN COME, WHATEVER NEEDS TO BE
DONE, WE CAN ALL WORK IT TOGETHER TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE
SITUATION.

I CAN TELL HIM WHERE I'M COMING FROM SO HE CAN GET

HIMSELF PREPARED.
THE COURT:

WHY DON'T YOU DO THAT.

THE DEFENDANT:

OKAY.

SOME OF THE THINGS I WOULD

SAY, WHICH MARY CORPORON DID MENTION VERY CLEARLY, LIKE YOU
SAID WE WOULD, YOU KNOW, TALKING ABOUT OTHER THINGS, THE
BIGGEST THING IS RULE 24 OF UTAH CRIMINAL PROCEDURES.

AND IT

SAYS, "IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE IF THERE IS ANY ERROR OR
IMPROPRIETY," CAN YOU UNDERSTAND ME OKAY?

"IMPROPRIETY WHICH

HAD A SUBSTANTIAL ADVERSE EFFECT UPON THE RIGHTS OF A PARTY."
AND THEN THERE ARE A COUPLE OF THINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN SAID ON
SOME OTHER CASES WHICH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED, STATE V WILLIAM,
STATE V SMITH.

OKAY.
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THERE ARE FOUR GROUNDS WHICH I AM APPLYING FOR.
ARE VERY CLEAR.

THERE IS NO DOUBT ABOUT THEM.

THEY

THERE IS

NOTHING PECULIAR OR HIDDEN ABOUT THEM.
THE FIRST GROUND, THE REASON FOR A NEW TRIAL, AND
YOUR HONOR, I'M SORRY, I'M NOT TRYING TO REMIND YOU OF YOUR JOB
OR WHATEVER, I'M SAYING THERE ARE THREE OUTCOMES WHICH I
PERCEIVE OF THIS HEARING.
RETRIAL.

ONE IS THAT I DON'T GET GRANTED THE

THE OTHER IS I GET GRANTED A RETRIAL.

THE THIRD ONE

IS, WHICH IS CONSIDERING THAT JUDGE STIRBA IS DECEASED RIGHT
NOW, THE THIRD IS THAT EVERYTHING GETS DISMISSED AGAINST ME.
AND I'M KEEPING ALL THOSE OPTIONS IN MIND.
THE REASON FOR RETRIAL, ONE OF THEM, THE FIRST ONE IS
THE NEW EVIDENCE WAS FOUND, MY ALIBI WITNESS.

MR. PARKER, I

WILL COME TO HOW HE'S APPROACHING THAT, THAT SHE WAS NOT ALIBI
WITNESS, AND WHATEVER, I WILL COME TO THE POINT IN A SECOND.
AND HE ALSO SAID THAT NEW EVIDENCE WAS NOT NEW
EVIDENCE, I KNEW IT BEFORE, AHEAD OF TIME.
CASE.

THAT IS NOT THE

THAT IS NOT THE TRUTH.
THE OTHER ONE IS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSELS.

THERE ARE A LOT OF LIES.
THINGS.

I HAVE BEEN KEPT IN DARK FOR A LOT OF

THE KEY WITNESSES HAVE BEEN DITCHED OUT OF DEBT.

THE

WAY WE PERCEIVE THINGS, THE WAY WE WANTED TO PRESENT IT, WAS
NOT PRESENTED THE WAY IT WAS.

I WILL ADDRESS IT IN A LITTLE

BIT.
THE THIRD ONE IS A SURPRISED LIE FROM THE ALLEGED
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VICTIMS.
THE COURT:

A SURPRISED LIE?

THE DEFENDANT:

LIE, YEAH.

I DON'T KNOW HOW TO

PHRASE IT IN A LAW TERM, BUT THERE'S SOMETHING LIKE THAT'S A
SURPRISE LIE WHICH IS AS CLEAR AS DAYLIGHT.

THESE PEOPLE

REPEATEDLY LIE AND JUDGE STIRBA, OR THE BIGGER JUDGES, JUDGE
BURTON, COULD NOT PICK IT UP.

THE WAY IT IS IS THAT THE THING

WHICH I'M CHARGED WITH IS BY ANY LAW OF PHYSICS, ANY LAW OF
SCIENCE, ANY LAW OF LOGIC IS IMPOSSIBLE.
IMPOSSIBLE.
THE TIME.
IT.

I CAN PROVE THAT.

IT IS 100 PERCENT

I WAS GOING TO PROVE THAT AT

WE ARRANGED EVERYTHING BUT MY ATTORNEY DID NOT DO

AND I AM AS CONFIDENT AS I'M SITTING OVER HERE THAT I CAN

PROVE IT, THAT THESE THINGS ARE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO BURGLARIZE
SOMEBODY CONSIDERING OTHER FACTORS.
AND THE FOURTH ONE IS THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT,
WHICH GOES TO MR. PARKER.

THE FIRST THING IS HE KNEW THAT THE

STATE DID NOT HAVE CASE, HE KNEW FROM THE VERY FIRST DAY, THE
POLICE KNEW FROM THE VERY FIRST DAY.
THE VERY FIRST DAY.

MR. BURNINGHAM KNEW FROM

MR. BURNINGHAM LIED QUITE A BIT TOO. AND

I WILL DO MY BEST TO PROVE -- THE PROBLEM IS, YOUR HONOR, I
DON'T KNOW WHO BELIEVES IN GOD AND WHO DOESN'T BELIEVE IN GOD
NOWADAYS.

THEY CAN LIFT THEIR HAND AND SAY WHATEVER THEY WANT

TO SAY AND JUST SIT UP HERE SURPRISES ME HOW EASILY THEY LIE.
SO I DON'T KNOW WHAT ELSE WOULD MAKE SOMEBODY TELL THE TRUTH.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, OTHER THAN, BUT THERE ARE A
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LOT OF OTHER THINGS, BUT THE KEY THING WHICH I WOULD MENTION IS
MY RE-INCARCERATION, WHICH WAS WHEN I WAS PUT BACK INTO THE
CUSTODY A SECOND TIME AND MY BAIL WAS RAISED SIX TIMES TO
125,000.00.

I WAS NOT A THREAT, YOU KNOW, BUT FOR WHATEVER

REASON MR. PARKER AND MR. BURNINGHAM CONVINCED JUDGE BURTON
THAT I AM A THREAT TO SOCIETY.

CONSIDERING THAT I DON'T HAVE A

VIOLENT PAST, NOT EVEN CONSIDERING WHATEVER THE PAST YOU SEE,
WHAT YOU SEE SOMETIMES IS NOT THE TRUTH.
NOT FOUND ON THOSE THINGS.

THE DEPOSITION WAS

THE THING WHICH YOU HAVE FOUND SOME

CHARGE ON WAS THE SAME REASON I TOOK A PLEA BARGAIN BECAUSE I
DIDN'T WANT TO WASTE MY TIME, THE KIND OF CHARGE WHICH' I HAD
FOR DISTURBANCE OF PEACE, OR SOMETHING.

THAT IS NOT A MAJOR

CHARGE ANYWAY.
THE RE-INCARCERATION, THE WAY IT AFFECTED, I'M GOING
TO EXPLAIN IT TO YOU, THE WAY IT AFFECTED, IS MALEENA, AND I
WILL CALL HER ALIBI WITNESS, BECAUSE ACCORDING TO MR. PARKER
ALIBI WITNESS IS THE ONE WHICH TELLS THAT THE PERSON WAS NOT
THERE PRESENT, PHYSICALLY PRESENT, AT THE SPOT OF CRIME AT THAT
CRITICAL TIME.

THAT IS EXACTLY HIS DEFINITION.

AM I RIGHT, MR. PARKER?
MR. PARKER:

HM-HM.

THE DEFENDANT:

WHAT I'M SAYING IS THAT SHE SAYS SHE

WAS WITH ME AT THE TIME.

SHE SAYS EVERYTHING, HOW WE WENT OUT,

FOR HOW LONG I WENT OUT, I CAME BACK, AND SHE PUTS ME IN MY OWN
APARTMENT AT THE TIME.

THAT MEANS I WAS NOT IN THE OTHER
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PEOPLE'S APARTMENT.
LOGIC.

THAT IS AN ALIBI WITNESS BY ANY SENSE OF

IF A WITNESS IS SAYING I WAS NOT ON THE OTHER SIDE OF

THE DOOR, I WAS ON THIS SIDE OF THE DOOR, THAT MAKES ALIBI
WITNESS.
WHAT HAPPENED WAS, I HAPPENED TO, WHEN I WAS OUT FOR
A WEEK, I HAPPENED TO GET HOLD OF MALEENA A DAY OR TWO BEFORE
ALL THIS HAPPENED.

I GOT REINCARCERATED.

I KNOW THERE'S SO

MANY THINGS, I AM TRYING TO CONFUSE THE COURT HERE.

FIRST

THING WHAT HAPPENED WITH MR. BURNINGHAM HAS CLEARLY LIED ABOUT
IS WHEN HE CAME ON FRIDAY, THE 4TH OF JUNE, 1999, WHEN I WAS IN
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL, I WAS IN THE SUICIDE SECTION SO I COULD
NOT MAKE ANY CALLS OR NOTHING.
EVERYTHING.

I WAS TOTALLY BANNED FROM

I HAD NO WAY TO GET AHOLD OF MALEENA AT THAT TIME.

MR. BURNINGHAM CAME THE NEXT DAY OF MY INCARCERATION, THE FIRST
INCARCERATION, AND I TOLD HIM EVERYTHING.

I WAIVED MY RIGHT TO

MIRANDA AND I TOLD HIM THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED, THIS IS WHAT
HAPPENED AND EVERYTHING, AND HE SAID IF YOU HAVE NOT DONE IT WE
DON'T WANT YOU IN HERE.

I CLEARLY TOLD HIM ABOUT MY ROOMMATE

AND I CLEARLY TOLD HIM ABOUT MALEENA.
IN THIS TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS HE HAS SAID CLEARLY THAT HE
WAS NOT ABLE TO GET HOLD OF HER.
GAVE HIM THE PHONE NUMBER.
HER.

THEN HE SAID THAT I NEVER

HE WAS NOT ABLE TO GET AHOLD OF

HOW, IF I WOULD NOT HAVE GIVEN HIM THE PHONE NUMBER, HOW

WOULD HE GOT HOLD OF SOMEBODY NAMED MALEENA?

BECAUSE THAT'S AS

CLEAR AS DAYLIGHT, CRYSTAL CLEAR, THAT I DID GIVE HIM THE PHONE
„

I
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NUMBER.

AND I EVEN MENTIONED IT, I STILL REMEMBER THE PHONE

NUMBER.

AND I MENTIONED IT IN THE TRIAL TOO.

MEMORY, YOUR HONOR.

I HAVE GOOD

I REMEMBERED ALL THOSE THINGS.

PEOPLE

THINK I'M MAKING THINGS UP BECAUSE OF THAT BUT THAT IS KNOWN
FACT.
HE ALSO PROMISED ME THAT HE WOULD COME BACK ON
MONDAY, THE FOLLOWING MONDAY.

HE NEVER DID.

HE ALSO WAS

SUPPOSED TO BE INVESTIGATING THE CASE A LOT MORE IN DETAIL,
FINDING ALL THE PHYSICAL, AND HE HAS CLEARLY MENTIONED, I DON'T
HAVE THE POLICE REPORTS BUT HE CLEARLY MENTION OVER HERE THAT
HE NEVER WAS ABLE TO GET TO ANY OF THE PERSON, ANY OF MY
ALLEGED VICTIMS.

AND NOTHING AT ALL.

AND STILL THEY END UP

FILING CHARGES WITHOUT ANY REASONING, WITHOUT FINDING OUT
ANYTHING, THAT ANYTHING IS BASED ON TRUTH.
ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ONLY WITNESS I HAD, HE HAD
NEVER EVEN GONE TO HER.
YOUR HONOR, YOU TELL ME WHAT KIND OF CIRCUMSTANCE
DOES IT MAKE, YOU TELL ME A NAME OF A PERSON, YOU SAY GO AND
CONTACT MR. MAURO OR SOMETHING, OR WHATEVER THIS ATTORNEY'S
NAME IS, YOU'RE TELLING ME TO GO AND CONTACT HIM, AND WITHOUT
GIVING ME THE ADDRESS OR PHONE NUMBER OF THE PERSON, YOU TELL
ME, HOW COULD I FIND THAT PERSON?
I WAS NOT ABLE TO CONTACT HER.
NUMBER.

WHY WOULD NOT I GO —

MR. BURNINGHAM CLEARLY SAID

I HAVE GIVEN HIM THE PHONE
IT'S JUST LIKE TOTALLY LOGICAL.

WHAT HAPPENED WAS, NOW I AM GOING TO COME BACK, I WAS
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ABLE TO GET AHOLD OF MALEENA A DAY BEFORE MY SECOND
INCARCERATION.

SHE TOLD ME, I ASKED HER, I SAID, SHE WAS NOT

NERVOUS, SHE IS A FOREIGN STUDENT AND STUFF, SHE WAS RELUCTANT,
WHATEVER I SAID, YOU KNOW, THIS IS GETTING A BIG ISSUE, YOU
WERE WITH ME, ALL YOU HAVE TO DO IS TESTIFY AND STUFF LIKE
THAT.

SHE SAID, I HAVE TO GO TO WORK RIGHT NOW, WHEREVER SHE

WAS WORKING, WHY DON'T WE GET TOGETHER IN A COUPLE OF DAYS.
AND I SAID FINE, YOU KNOW.

I WAS WORKING AND DRIVING MY CAB

TOO.
NEXT DAY I CAME OVER HERE IN FRONT OF JUDGE ATHERTON
AND WAS PUT BACK INTO THE JAIL.

WHATEVER, YOU KNOW, HER PHONE

NUMBER, DID NOT ACCEPT COLLECT CALLS OR WHATEVER, BUT THE THING
IS, I COULD NOT GET HER.

NOW THEY TELL ME WHOSE FAULT IS THIS.

MR. PARKER IS THE ONE WHO CONVINCED, OTHERWISE THAT WITNESS
WOULD HAVE COME IN FRONT OF IT. MR. PARKER WAS THE ONE, OR
MR. BURNINGHAM DID PUT ME INCARCERATION AGAIN, WHICH WAS
EXTREMELY ILLEGAL, I WOULD SAY, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO REASONS.
I WANT TO KNOW WHAT REASONS.

ALL THEY DID IS LIKE PERCEIVE A

PICTURE INTO A CERTAIN MIND THAT MAYBE I'M A TERRORIST OR
SOMETHING, WHATEVER THEY WANT.

THIS PERSON IS A DANGEROUS

INDIVIDUAL, HE'S THIS, HE'S THAT, BLAH, BLAH, BLAH.

AND LIKE

STATE ALWAYS DO, JUDGES, YOU KNOW, YOU GET PAID BY THE STATE,
AND ALWAYS TAKE THE STATE'S SIDE.
EVERYBODY KNOWS ABOUT IT.

AND THIS IS AN OPEN FACT.

THAT IS THE REASON I'M TIRED OF YOU

USING THE SYSTEM, OR WHATEVER.
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OTHER THAN I TRIED TO CONTACT MALEENA AFTER THAT
SEVERAL TIMES WHEN I GOT OUT AGAIN, AFTER ONE MONTH, THROUGH
RON YENGICH.

I WENT TO HER HOUSE, I CALLED HER PHONE NUMBER,

IT WAS DISCONNECTED, THEN WE TRIED SO MANY TIMES, EVEN WHEN I
MARRIED MY WIFE AND STUFF LIKE THAT, ME AND MY WIFE TRIED TO
FIND HER, WE DID EVERYTHING TO FIND HER.
EVERYTHING.

MY FATHER-IN-LAW DID

THESE PEOPLE ARE ALL THE WITNESSES.

EVERYTHING TO FIND HER.

WE COULD NOT FIND HER.

THEY DID
ALL WE COULD

FIND IS HER ROOMMATE WAS LIVING ON THIS VISA THAT SHE LEFT
SOMEWHERE TO CALIFORNIA OR SOMETHING.

THEY DON'T EVEN SPEAK

MUCH ENGLISH BECAUSE THEY'RE...
I DON'T KNOW HOW FAR I SHOULD GO OFF INTO THAT
DIRECTION.
THE COURT:

I THINK IF YOU GIVE MR. PARKER, AS YOU'VE

DONE, A LITTLE OVERVIEW OF WHAT YOU'RE GOING TO DO THAT HELPS
HIM KINDA BE PREPARED.

I THINK OUR NEXT STEP MAYBE IS TO GET A

DATE AND MAKE SURE MR. MAURO AND/OR MR. SIKORA GET TO YOU SO
THAT THEY CAN BE READY, I WOULD THINK.

ISN'T THAT OUR BEST

BET?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

I MEAN, AT THIS JUNCTURE WE'LL JUST BE

TALKING ABOUT WHAT MAY OR MAY NOT HAPPEN AND WE WON'T MAKE AS
MUCH HEADWAY

—

THE DEFENDANT:

YOUR HONOR, JUST I UNDERSTAND WHERE

YOU'RE COMING FROM AND I'M NOT LIKE —

IF YOU GIVE ME A FEW

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:
MR. GARCIA:

Okay.

Mr. Garcia, are you ready?

Yes, your Honor, I'm here—I've been

called here on the Hassan—
THE COURT:
MR. GARCIA:
THE COURT:
Okay.

Oh, you have, huh?
Yes.
Well, he's probably back there.

Mr. Garcia?

MR. GARCIA:
THE COURT:

What's going on, Judge?
Well, the best I could know is, j.f I

understand it right, Mr. Hassan, you had an attorney named
Mauro and Mauro got accused by you of stealing stuff.

The Bar

took your complaint seriously and is now chasing Mr. Mauro.
Mr. Mauro has to withdraw because you've made it so that he
can't represent you.
And so I guess, Mr. Garcia, you must be one of the
conflict attorneys?
MR. GARCIA:
THE COURT:

I am.
So, you're here because Mr. Hassan sort

of needs an attorney, but I don't know, do you want one, Mr.
Hassan?

I'm never really sure what you want.
MR. HASSAN:

Okay.

Your Honor, the way it stands

right now, I'm (inaudible) I go through that letter o f —
THE COURT:

What letter?
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MR. HASSAN:

You don't get the letter?

THE COURT: No.
MR. HASSAN:

What letter?

Okay.

I—I wrote you the one letter—
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Recently?
Yeah, recently.
You told me you wouldn't do that

anymore,
MR. HASSAN:

I know.

That's what I wrote in the

letter, that I didn't have a choice once you dropped the case
and all, and I told you what—what I'm planning to do.,
THE COURT:

I don't know that I saw—I haven't seen

that.
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, then I —

And I wouldn't be sitting in here if I

dismissed it?
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

Okay.

Then, my—because—

What's the letter say?
It basically says that—that what

happened with—with Mauro and stuff, you know, and I didn't—I
didn't have a choice to—other than writing you and letting
you know what my intentions are.
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

And—

What are you intentions right now?
My intentions are, for right now is to

go ahead and—and—and go to proceedings right now, whatever I
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have already because I have delayed my Board of Pardon date
and stuff like that and it's been going on for too long.

And

if it goes—because if I—I get approved or I don't get
approved, whatever it is, you know, I—I need to just go ahead
and—with the proceedings today.
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

Do you want Mr. Garcia to help you?
He might not be familiar with my case

so I —
THE COURT:

I'm certain he—I'm certain he knows

nothing about it.
MR. HASSAN:

He—

MR. GARCIA:

I don't even know that much.

THE COURT:

Huh?

He doesn't even know nothing—

nothing.
MR. GARCIA:
THE COURT:

RightHe's here because as people who took

Mauro off, told him to come and fill in, so he doesn't know,
he can't help you—
MR. HASSAN:

Yeah.

That's what I'm saying.

I am

ready with the proceedings, with whatever little bit
(inaudible) because Mauro is not here, you know.

I'll—I'll

mention it to you, but we need to get going now, you know,
it's—
MR. GARCIA:
THE COURT:

Where are we in the proceedings?
Well, Mr. Mauro was investigating, if I
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understood right, you had given him the name of a couple of
witnesses that will support some things that you thought had
gone awry.
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

But then—then—

And then he tracked down one of them and

was looking for the others when you said he stole some of your
stuff.
MR. HASSAN:

Yeah.

But that's (inaudible) and I

have reasons for what he did, I took—told him not to deceive
me and be—be reasonable and be up front with me and I told
him to—I gave him documents, made four copies to (inaudible)
and continued request, you know, I have a 4:00 o'clock
hearing, I need those documents, he—he won't give it back to
me.
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:
you know.

Okay.
And that's where the problems occurred,

I didn't have a choice but to go to the Utah State

Bar.
At this point in time, that—that handicap is going
to be there that we don't have the—those witnesses on—on the
stand or something but I (inaudible) and I can—I can proceed
to court with what I have and will.
THE COURT:
going ahead.

D o — I mean, I guess I don't mind you

I don't know that—were you thinking we were

going ahead today?
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MR. PARKER:

Well, it's actually set for a motion

for—for the motion, but no, I didn't suspect that we were.
The motions have been filed.

I would suggest that maybe we

take a little time for counsel to talk to the defendant and
gather a little information, at least help him make that
decision before we do proceed.
MR. GARCIA:

Well, he wants to represent himself?

You w a n t —
THE COURT:

He's kind of on and off wanted to do

that, but it was—it's a motion for a new trial and I.wasn't
sure Mr. Hassan was going to navigate the waters as well as he
could.
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

You know, I —
And I don't want to take away his right.

I mean, if he wants t o —
MR. HASSAN:

Like I said, I — I wrote you the letter

and I was under the presumption that you had read that letter
and that it was agreed with the State—
MR. PARKER:

I didn't—

MR. HASSAN:

— t h a t I'm ready to proceed with—

THE COURT:

I thought we were done with letters,

so. • •
MR. HASSAN:

Okay.

Well, I — I understand what, you

know, has happened, but the way I am right now, whatever
things 'cause if the thing don't go the way I want it, then I
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want to the appeal process and then—maybe then—(inaudible)
Garcia—maybe then Garcia—or Mr. Garcia or something, you
know, can—can help me but I want to get done with this step
right now.
MR. GARCIA:

You're on parole?

MR. PARKER:

No.

THE COURT:
MR. PARKER:
THE COURT:
degree felonies.

No.

He's in—he's got two one to 1 5 —

Five to life.
Five to life, yeah, I guess, two first

I think they're aggravated—

MR. HASSAN:

Aggravated burglary, yeah.

But your Honor, I —
THE COURT:

And he had a bench trial in front of

Judge Stirba and was found guilty; is that—
MR. PARKER:
THE COURT:
MR. PARKER:
THE COURT:

That's correct.
Is my memory right?
That's correct.
And sentenced to the—I think they're

concurrent; right?
MR. HASSAN:

Yes, your Honor.

MR. PARKER:

You shake a memory that's been too

long.
THE COURT:
MR. PARKER:
THE COURT:

Five to life.
Correct.

That is correct.

So, he has five to life o n —
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MR. GARCIA:

So, he was convicted on a bench trial

and now he's moving to withdraw his pleas?
THE COURT:
MR. GARCIA:
THE COURT:
MR. GARCIA:
THE COURT:
MR. PARKER:

No.

He's—he's wanting a new trial.

Wanting a new trial.
Right.

And I —

Based o n —
— I don't remember—
I have copies of the motion.

What

happened is that he's gone through several attorneys, some of
the initial ones filed a motion for a new trial, I believe
that was Mary Corporon, and we've been dealing with that
motion since.

And he's had several attorneys, each wanted to

investigate and check into the motions—
MR. GARCIA:

I see.

MR. PARKER:

—before actually arguing the motions.

THE COURT:

They don't get too far because Mr.

Hassan and they—
MR. GARCIA:
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

Don't get along.
—have a parting of the ways.
Conflict.

Yeah, I'm a hard person to

get along with, I'm—
THE COURT:

He's been real nice lately.

He got in

the face of one of the officers at the prison once, but
lately, he's been really a good guy.

He's quit threatening to

blow me up, that's been a good thing; although I didn't take
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him too seriously.
MR, HASSAN:

Yeah, you did not.

THE COURT: No.
MR. HASSAN:

Considering where I am, you know...

THE COURT:

Well, that's kind of where I viewed it,

MR. GARCIA:

Well, I'm probably harder to get along

yeah.

with than you are.
MR. HASSAN:

Well, we'll have a good time then.

Your Honor, like I said, right now, I—I feel
desperately in the need of getting the proceeding, you know,
the—done.

I'm sorry Mr. Parker is not ready or something,

'cause these are—we have set the date and I wrote you that
letter, I—I—you know.
THE COURT:

Because you assumed I'd read it, I

don't—
MR. HASSAN:

Well, you know what I am saying is that

because it's a big situation.

In order for him to get ready,

it's going to take him three months more, I'm just ready.
THE COURT:

No question that Mr. Garcia will want to

spend a little time on it.
MR. HASSAN: Yes.
THE COURT:
on your own?

So, do you want to—say you want to go

I mean—

MR. HASSAN:

Yes, your Honor.
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THE COURT:

— I think you're clear enough minded, I

know that you know the process well.

Mr. Garcia would be

happy to help you.
It would take a little while.

I mean, I think Mr.

Garcia would be reluctant to say, yeah, let's go today,
there's a lot at stake for you and then Mr. Garcia has a—a
duty to do the very best he can.
MR. GARCIA:
THE COURT:
today and help you.

So—

I have an obligation to be competent.
Yeah.

And so you can—he can't go ahead

I don't think he could ever take.that

position.
MR. GARCIA:

I know.

That's what I'm saying.

I

would—
THE COURT:

So, in your mind, if today is the day,

then you're probably going to have to say, I don't want Mr.
Garcia's help, I'm going to go on my own.
MR. HASSAN:

Not at this point then, I don't want—

I'm sorry, but I'm ready t o —
MR. GARCIA:
THE COURT:

Nothing personal.
Mr. Garcia is not going to take it

personally.
MR. GARCIA:
THE COURT:

May I be excused?
You may.

MR. GARCIA:

Thank you.

MR. PARKER:

I do think, your Honor, if he's going

10

to go* on his own, we need to go over what is—seems to be
known as the Frampton inquiries and that is to check with him
to see if he understands what he's doing and the results and
consequences and his inexperience to be able to represent
himself.
THE COURT:

Well, I kind of thought he—he had

demonstrated that before, but I mean—
MR. PARKER:

I think we at least ought to go through

the questions and inquire of him, whether or not the answer is
obvious.
THE COURT:

All right.

Well, let me try tha.t, Mr.

Hassan.
You, at this juncture, you're clearly not able to
hire an attorney, you can't go out and pay for one?
MR. HASSAN:

No.

THE COURT:

Okay.

I can't.
So, we know that's a fact, 'cause

you've been in custody for like three years now.
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Two-and-a-half.
Two-and-a-half.

All right.

So, you'd be a person to whom we could appoint an
attorney and you understand we'd do that if you wanted, the
State would pay for your attorney.

You've decided today, if I

understood you right, you don't want the attorney's help.
MR, HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
And so, do you feel like you're
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competent to go ahead and help yourself?
MR, HASSAN:

I'm pretty sure I'm competent•

THE COURT:

You understand that Mr. Parker is

trained in the law and that he knows what's going on and in
theory—
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

And I —

—I'm trained in the law and I'm

supposed to know what's going on.
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Yeah.
And so you're the only one of the three

of us in—
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

I know I've got a —
~theory~
—handicap or whatever, but I have been

there, done that, I—I just don't want to have any more
attorneys that won't do what I want and—
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Okay.
—just keep on going.
Now, you obviously have other remedies

besides this new trial.

And I think you've talked about it,

you want to appeal something,—
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Uh huh.
—which is fine, because you understand

you've got to get this one out of the way first before you go
that step; but you understand that if you go ahead and because
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you aren't as experienced and able, you might be giving away
opportunities or rights that other folks have?
MR. HASSAN:

Yeah.

I—I'm aware of that, t h e — t h e —

like I said, the only handicap which I'm having with not
having attorneys is those—that those people are not
subpoenaed, and but I have—I have those statements and stuff
that what I will present, but otherwise, you know, they would
have been subpoenaed.

That's something which the Court should

keep in mind, you know, that I don't have—you know, I tried
everything to get those people subpoenaed.
THE COURT:
very good point.

Well, but I mean, so that brings., up a

I mean, you're giving up the right to have

folks come in and give testimony in your behalf, not in your
personal behalf, but in behalf of a motion that you bring.
And is that a wise thing for you to do?
MR. HASSAN:
of the situation.

Your Honor, I—I'm way sick and tired

I just do not have any more (inaudible) to

be with attorneys, be it attorneys and—but they all make me
look bad and I, you know, it just—whatever happens, it just—
it's not—it's not that we (inaudible) different way or maybe
I'm supposed to be representing whatever handicap I have,
whatever I present, I'll present.

I know that we're supposed

to be (inaudible) and you know, it would be documented type
stuff, you know, I—I assume.

And I'm just saying I just want

to bring all the (inaudible) I can bring and then from there
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onwards, I just want the transcripts, you know, (inaudible)
that's all, and then you (inaudible)
THE COURT:

Okay.

And I guess since you're just

sick and tired, that's really why you're doing this; is that a
wise thing to do?

You're just kind of full of it—I mean

tired of it and so on.
MR. HASSAN:

It's a—it's—the thing is that the way

I—I can present myself, the way I know the cases, the way I
know the situation is much better than—than the way other
attorneys know and the way they—I called earlier to bring all
those things which I wanted him to bring, you know, so, it's—
it's always going to be a handicap because I'm—I'm fighting
this (inaudible) misconduct and so attorneys don't want to
fight against their own (inaudible)
THE COURT:

I gotcha.

All right.

Well, you're

comfortable with what you're doing?
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Mr. Parker, should we ask him anything

more?
MR. PARKER:
Honor.

No.

I—I think that's sufficient, your

I would place on the record that we have been here

numerous times and had discussions with the defendant about
various aspects of this proceeding and he's written both the
Court and myself and other people numerous times also
expressing his desires.
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THE COURT:
MR. PARKER:

True.
So, I think given all that, he shows

and presents and understanding of the procedure and—and at
least an understanding of what he wants to occur and the way
he wants it to occur.
THE COURT:
right.

I'd agree with that conclusion.

All

Well, we'll catch a few of these others, then we'll

bring you out and then we'll talk about what we need to do.
MR. HASSAN:

All right.

(Whereupon, the Judge handled unrelated matters.)
THE COURT:

Bring Mr. Hassan out; right?

THE CLERK:

Yeah.

THE COURT:

Are you okay, Mr. Parker, to go now?

MR. PARKER:
THE COURT:
OFFICE:

Just go get our (inaudible)

Go ahead.
Let's go.

Your Honor, are you going to order him to

be cuffed so he can access—
THE COURT:
OFFICER:

How do you feel?

I really don't know him.

The other

officer would be better asked, I've never had to deal with
him.

So far, he's never been a problem whatsoever.
THE COURT:

Right.

You know, there are just moments

when he kind of gets angry and—
OFFICER:

So, I would—

THE COURT:

But usually, we see that early on, s o —
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Mr. Hassan, the officer was wondering if you should be
uncuffed and I'm inclined to do what you think is the best.
MR. PARKER:

Would it be appropriate to have one

hand unrestrained so that if he needs to go through his
property.
THE COURT:

Well, I think it's fine.

It's more of a

concern—
OFFICER:

Which hand do you right witr:?

Right or

left?
THE COURT:

I mean, I want you to be doing what you

should.
OFFICER:

Making it our call, basically.

THE COURT:

Mr. Hassan has always been good to—to

me, but I'm worried about your job.
OFFICER:

Yeah.

THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

That's—you do it the way you need to,
You know, I'm mellow today, don't worry

about it.
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Today you're happy, huh?
I won't say I'm happy, you know, I'm—
Well, that's a bad word.
Yeah.
But you're good, today.

How's your arm?
MR. HASSAN:

You got hurt once, didn't you?

I—I was—this is the fourth time ray
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hand has been broken in prison.

Once on here and there, then

my blood vessels, which police officers broke, then my hand
broke from here, my finger broke.
THE COURT:

It's just a curse on me.

Mr. Hassan, we're here then to consider

your motion for a new trial and we'd like you to begin, if
you'd like.
MR. HASSAN:

Won't there be any stenograph or

something, your Honor?
THE COURT:

No, and you know, I think what happened

is, they got to the point where, on the first degrees, there's
so few of them anymore, that unless it's a capital case, I
don't think they come in.
Isn't that the method now, Marcy?
THE CLERK:

Unless it's an evidentiary hearing.

THE COURT:

Oh, okay.

Unless we have witness

testimony.
THE CLERK:

Correct.

THE COURT:

But we do have a tape and—

MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Okay.
You wouldn't have a—(inaudible) I'll

give you a tape and you can go home and listen to it. That
won't work.

But you know, they can make a record—or a

transcript from the tape.
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

They can?
Yeah.

The tape runs on everything we do,
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got wanna,

MR, HASSAN:
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

Oh, did—
Instead of want to, you wanna.
Yeah.

I'm learning the slang—

I don't know.
Americanize and then you guys want to

send me back home, you know.
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

There you are, see?
Yeah.

I'm—I'm becoming more like you

and the rest.
THE COURT:

Well, that's not good, you ought to go

somewhere where you won't have that problem.
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

Yeah.
Okay.
Your Honor, just a couple of things.

Let me start from the name of (inaudible) the merciful, a
couple of things I just say before we proceed and it won't be
wrong at all.

This time, I have—and I—I've written more

things like in writing so I don't go out of line and you know,
and just start talking all those—
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

Okay.
—what I (inaudible) things, you know.

And I'm just going to pretty much read what I have written to
you and stuff.
THE COURT:

But just do that clearly and as fully as

makes sense to you.
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MR. HASSAN:

And having said that, I would remind

all of you that this proceeding would be closely scrutinized
by many Pakistani politicians and lawyers, so please—and this
is—this is a request, you know, please, (inaudible) out of
logic and not out of like—out of the answer like, you know,
be like, I think (inaudible) involves a little bit more, you
know, more personally, you know, like—like, you know, just
give me the reasonings, this is the reason you are denying it,
this is the reason you're accepting it, you know, that's—I—
I'm not trying to tell you your job, but this makes life
easier for me, you know.
THE COURT:

Well, I think so you'll know, I—if I'm

going to do it right, I have to do that.
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

All right.
I have to give some reasons for what I

do.
MR. HASSAN:

Like I said, my experiences are bad; so

once bitten by a snake, a person is always scared of
(inaudible)
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

I—I'm with you.
Okay.

Let's start over here, these are

some of the opening arguments.

Your Honor, one more time for

the record that if Judge Stirba died, I'm sorry she did and
all, that is not my fault.
THE COURT:

No.

Nobody ever thought it was.
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let's*drop all these (inaudible)
THE COURT:

Okay.

And now I'll be candid with you,

Mr. Hassan, I don't think I could ever do that.
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Okay.
Because I would have had to have heard

the trial, and because I am the successor to her, I don't
think there's any hope at all that I will say, gee, based on
what he's told me and not having heard the trial, I will now
find him not guilty and dismiss the case.

I could not do

that.
MR. HASSAN:

Okay.

But it's a—but it is a-*-in—in-

-in the—by the—by the books, you know, and by the law, you
do have the discretion, that's all what I want to say.

You—

you might not do it, that's a separate thing; but Judge Stirba
has the discretion.
THE COURT:

Right.

I think she had it and it

doesn't make sense for me to try and do that, because I was
not at the trial, I never saw a single witness; so I mean, for
me to do what you ask—
MR. HASSAN:

I—I understand, your Honor.

What I'm

saying is, don't you think that it's a disadvantage for me
that now Judge Stirba is dead, you know, so I have lost that
opportunity.
THE COURT:

Oh.

I mean, like you say, it's not your

fault, but there's not a thing anybody can do about that.
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then I would humbly suggest that we can do the proceeding,
then—then please take time before you make t h e —
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:

Well —
—findings—
(Inaudible) that I should probably—if

it's relevant, then I ought t o —
MR. HASSAN:

Exactly.

The trial transcript is the

key to my case, you know.
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

Okay.
And you know how hard we worked to get

it.
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

I'm getting you.
I also want to bring to the Courts

attention that in spite of my repeated requests and attempts
to various attorneys, none of the people who would have helped
this hearing have been subpoenaed.

Those are the facts, we

can delay it as long as we want and stuff, attorneys play
games again and again and I don't want to expose this—not
the—the—the case right now, but trust me to that, that they
just do not want to fight, a lot of people have looked and
taken my case.

Being (inaudible) and how all these things

are.
I also want t o —
THE COURT:

Do you mind if I—I mean, I—I just want

to make it real clear, I am assuming that you don't want them
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THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

Okay.

Right.

(Inaudible) But if you think that those

things would have been heard in the end, you—you're not
(inaudible) the statements I have, then we'll—we can talk
about it after that.
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

Okay.
Yeah.

I think I understand
Because you think, you know,

yeah, if—if—if she would have, instead of writing it down,
she would have been here and said all those things—
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

Right.
—that that would have made a different

picture in your mind, we can talk about that.
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

Okay.
All right.

And I don't know how Mr.

Parker want to do it, I have everything written down, the
(inaudible) and stuff, strictly by the Rule 24 and I can start
reading it and start giving you the exhibits.

That's the way

I planned.
Does he want to make those objections right now or
something like that and does he want to give this—
THE COURT:

He would object if, at some point, it's

appropriate.
MR. HASSAN:
THE COURT:
MR. HASSAN:

Okay.
He's there, paying attention.
Okay.

But--
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THE COURT:

They pointed at: you, Mack, thai" y o u

* jUiii'i! lie helping bring up t h e e x h i b i t s ,
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER
f Ill 1

merciful,

I I A . S S A I I II

II l

es.

I III" •••"'

.1 i i (

II

I I I"

( 1 II b l o II

I II

i our Honor, the reason I'm in troot of yon todav \~

to establish the foundation on my request for a new trial ,
III11" mi mi "nil

Il . 1 II II

Il

i n III i III II mi I ,

I , i , I. il mi mi I ILii,

"'; i l l I l i e i i iei'i i oi

on: i :ii i l l :i :i: i

support of motion for new trial, which haw been document • documented by oiif of
1 IS

iiry p r e v i o u s c o u n s e l s , Mary Corpor o n .

i III'1 in III ii I I I II II I II I

THE COURT:

II

•

•

•'

•

, •

A n d are you nble to leave these w i 1:1 I i is?

MR • HASSAN":
THE COURT:

• •

Let

, 1111 r 1111 not.
uka y .

Ma y 111•;"

' UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

Pardon ?
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Plaintiff;
-vs-

CaseNo OOIQI u ^ S , (><">PM ™4MS

REHANHASSi il J,
Hon. Michael K. Burton
Defendant.
I his matter came before this court: for hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial on
et 1 ) 2002 Defei icla i it ^ ra s pi s sen: it Pi: o se, I: ta1 • ii lg

\ i igust 1

waived appointed counsel, Paul B. Parker, Deputy Salt Lake Distnct - Ittomey; represented the
State

A motion for a new trial v 'ith memoranda had been submitted in defendant's behalf by

earlier defense counsel,

Mate also submitted memoranda

W itnesses were called ai id

testified, Both parties argued the matter fully.
I Ia\ ing listened t ::! th' 5 witnesses
I j i h parties, this court makes the following tindingswt ;^;, . ...*. ^»< Slb *: , a w

II II WINGS OF !•',< i IT
1.

lM

^.- .

'.. .

Defendant was charged with multiple counts of Aggravated Burglary and
Assault in one information and a single count of Aggravated Burglar/ in a
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2.

All the counts were alleged to have occurred at the same location The
majonty of the counts alleged the same two victims, J D and Carol Miller
and occurred on May 29, 1999 The Millers alleged that defendant had
kicked open the door to their apartment and had entered three times
assaulting and threatening them During one of these entries, defendant
had threatened the Millers with what looked like a small handgun Count
number three an Assault, was alleged to have occurred on June 3, 1999
with another victim, Kathy Hams In that count, Kathy Hams allege4 that
she confronted defendant about a power cord he had plugged into the
apartment building hall outlet. In response, defendant attacked her.

3.

After separate preliminary hearings, the two informations were combined
for trial and set before Judge Anne Stirba.

4.

Defendant sought legal assistance and, because of a conflict with the Salt
Lake Legal Defender's, Office Edward Montgomery was appointed to
represent defendant.

5.

Ed Montgomery investigated the allegations and defendant's alibi, talked
with witnesses, reviewed police reports and hired an investigator

6.

Prior to trial, Edward Montgomery filed a motion to sever count three, the
Assault on Kathy Hams, from the other counts.

7.

After filing the motion, defendant waived the jury trial.

8.

Defendant talked with Mr. Montgomery and defendant's wife about the
waiver. Defendant and Mr. Montgomery discussed the difficulties and
benefits of a bench trial as compared to a jury trial. Defendant decided
that Judge Stirba would be more favorable to defendant rather than a jury
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R

that would not likely be able to relate to defendant's background and

9.

Ed Montgomery testified that he withdrew the motion to severe because it
would nof have made any difference since the indue who would be hearing
the idse kiiLi\ ihe Litis iln >piicul Mi iUuiUgorner> a testimonv tru
• court docket indicates that Judge Stirba heard but denied the motion

iv.

The day of the assault on Kathv Hams, poIWe *

•''

defendant into custody at the scene. Defendant v

«»

identification. He stated that v ' A ^ :t ms car bat *\?
where

permission

"

K.

>M sav exactly

i

;•> .n .* c , .i

•» iuok m* i:v, identification * Mve :p-,ue' T.

car, v n* e -oking for t K e * ientificati•'>liij(jed i igajeiie Itghiei

, IT

:e 'our i irvt ^e - - sun

I lie lighter nuii/hed the description ot trie gun

the Millers stated that defendant had threatened them with.
11.

Mr. Montgomery did not file a motion tc • suppress the seizi it: e of a gi u: i
shaped cigarette lighter from defei idant's cai

12

The bench trial was held on Mi>

13.

Dm ing the ti ial. I Ii I! I :)i: itj
Millers about the ineoiisiskaucs

••

e • .

v. *eiumunies, the unusuai joints of

their testimonies, and he ci oss-examined Ms. N filler about: her past

also cross-examined Mr. Miller about the damage to the door and his
attempts to repair the door Mi Montgomery cross-examined Detecti i e
Brad B u r m i n g h a m about I: lis failui ; to f ii i

. i la med "" I \"!a lena, ' ai id
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whether the door could have actually had been damaged so little as it was
if it had been locked as the Millers described.
14.

Defendant wanted to present the testimony of some locksmiths who would
have testified that the door would have been damaged more if the door had
been kicked in.

15.

Mr. Montgomery refused to present the witnesses because he had
previously checked with another expert who had said the damage was
consistent with the Miller's description. In light of that, Mr. Montgomery
chose, rather than a battle of conflicting experts, to cross-examine and
impeach the police witness and Mr. Miller on the damage.

16.

Mr. Montgomery also refused to introduce the testimony of some
character witnesses that would have testified about defendant's good
character. Defendant had a record of past assaults. Mr. Montgomery did
not want to open the door to defendant's past assaults by introducing
evidence of defendant's good character.

17.

Defendant took the stand at the trial and testified that he had been using
power from the apartment hallway outlets since his own power had been
shut off. He admitted arguing with Carol Miller at her door about her
unplugging or cutting his power cords. He also admitted arguing with
Kathy Harris but said he had to push her out of his apartment. He denied
entering the Miller's apartments, and assaulting them. He denied
assaulting Kathy Harris.

18.

Following the evidence and the arguments, Judge Stirba found defendant
guilty of two counts of Aggravated Burglary and three counts of Assault.
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• Defendant was sentenced to prison on July 18, 2000.
.• :i"i it

defendant and his wife present, ric found, that her testimony would not
have helped defendant. Malena was also reluctant to testify'1 since she was
would expose her
relationship with defendant.
21.

> lalena's testimony, proffered in *
apartment with defendant

^

derenaa*^

J

^

.-. , it

argument in the hallwa) in which a woman and defendant both spoke with

entered the Miller's apartment. She did say that after defendant returned,
he did not leave the apartment any more that e\ ening.
22.

<

r

attorneys, one of whom filed the motion for a new trial Before the motion
was heard defendant waived further assistance of counsel \\M\ pn ce^ri it
the hearing on the motion, Pro se.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant's decision to w.iivt" flu1 iiiiin

.MH <I I IHMF

mil iiiihiHininl n i

Defendant had the advise ol counsel 1 Ic made a choice among
alternatives and his decision was not unreasonable. 2.

Ed Montgomery's
strategy and not unreasonable.

3.

Ed Montgomery's decision, to ^ vithdrau the motion to sever was sound
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informed, by the informations and the motion, of all the counts and the
allegations upon with the counts were based.
4.

There was not a legal basis to support a motion to suppress since
defendant had consented to the search of his car for identification and the
cigarette lighter that looked like a gun was found during that search.

5.

Ed Montgomery's decision not to send notice of experts and call experts
about the damage to the door was a reasonable trial strategy given the fact
that the experts were conflicting and the inconsistencies in the Miller's
statements were such that he could choose to impeach their testimonies
more effectively.

6.

Ed Montgomery's decision to not call witnesses about defendant's good
character was sound trial strategy particularly because admission of good
character in evidence would have allowed the State to introduce evidence
of defendant's bad character.

7.

Ed Montgomery was not ineffective in his assistance of defendant at trial.

8.

The testimonies of the locksmiths are not new and previously unavailable
evidence because the statements were known and available before the

trial.
9.

The testimony of Malena was not an "alibi" because she was not present
during the argument and the assaults. Instead, her purported testimony,
was merely cumulative of other evidence presented and therefore would
not have changed the outcome of the trial.

10.

There are no grounds for granted defendant's motion for a new trial.
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ORDER
Rased u|puii iL |iw.u!iiiiv, 1'imliHi s» otl\ii I ind i niu lusinns iM I ,i\v 11 IS
ORDERED that defendant's motion for a new trial is DENTED.
t.

. .

i

WfhdayofOjUetJer. 2002.
j\

T^E COURT:

/ ; -

UTON, District jffd&5>A
MICHAEL K. BURTON,
Approved as to form:

Rehan Hassan, Pro se
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact,
Conclusions Of Law And Order was delivered to Pro Se, Attorney for Defendant Rehan Hassan,
at P.O. Box 250, Salt Lake City, Utah 84020 on the y ^ d a y of October, 2002.

